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I. INTRODUCTION: USING RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES TO
AVOID AND MINIMIZE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LIABILITIES
Employment lawyers have witnessed a virtual revolution in
employment relations law during the past thirty years. Traditionally, the
employment relationship was regarded as "at will," and thus terminable
by the employer or employee at any time, for any reason, or for no
reason at all.1 Although the federal government intervened substantially
in private employment relationships in response to the economic catas-
trophe of the Great Depression,2 employers remained largely free of reg-
ulation until the 1960's, when statutory and common law exploded with
new developments. Today, federal statutes affording protections to
employees address a wide range of issues and are often supplemented by
state legislation. Much of this legislation defines the civil rights of
applicants and employees by prohibiting various forms of discrimina-
tion. 3  The potential liabilities associated with discrimination in the
workplace comprise only part of a much broader exposure that employ-
ers face in the changing employment law environment,4 but discrimina-
1. For discussions of the history and merit of the "at will" rule, see Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); see also
Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-at-Will: The True
Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
2. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994); Federal Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act (Social Security Act) of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-
33 (1988); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-17 (1994); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1987,
2000e (1991)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994); Americans
With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
4. Increasingly, Congress has passed legislation which generally regulates the terms and
conditions of employment, going far beyond the anti-discrimination principle. See Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2109 (1994); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. Additionally, there have been significant developments in the
common law of employment relations, including expanded recognition of implied-in-fact
contracts premised on oral statements or employee handbooks, promissory estoppel, defamation,
and wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy.
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tion liabilities remain a preeminent concern for most employers.
For many employers, managing this risk of liability is a vital part of
their human resources mission and an important part of their general
corporate cost-control program. It would be unrealistic to study the
legal liabilities and remedies afforded by anti-discrimination laws with-
out also assessing the risk management strategies undertaken by
employers in response to these laws. Stable and effective risk manage-
ment is sometimes elusive, since the rapidly changing legal landscape
and resulting doctrinal uncertainty can render it difficult to assess and
minimize the client's exposure with any assurance until the appeals in a
particular case have been exhausted. Nevertheless, corporations actively
pursue risk management as an important goal in the area of employment
discrimination.
The tremendous increase in discrimination suits brought against
employers5 has made risk management of discrimination liabilities par-
ticularly important. Because defense expenditures and the potential for
judgments or settlements resulting from suits alleging employment dis-
crimination represent significant costs that must be minimized in a com-
petitive economy, risk management is driven by strong financial
incentives. In this sense, risk management is the product of a cost-bene-
fit analysis that weighs a significant exposure against the relatively small
cost of minimizing liability. Additionally, liability for certain kinds of
discriminatory behavior (such as sexual harassment) by supervisors and
other employees is assessed against employers if they are unable to
establish that the offending employee was acting outside the scope of the
agency relationship. Consequently, an employer must adopt proactive
anti-discrimination policies to avoid vicarious liability,6 meaning that
risk management is driven directly by the legal requirements of anti-
discrimination laws. Finally, a business may wish to avoid the negative
consequences of discrimination claims that are not directly legal or
5. Two commentators report that the employment discrimination caseload in the federal
courts grew at the astonishing rate of 2,166% between 1970 and 1989, as compared to an overall
increase in the federal caseload of 125%. See John J. Donahue, III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 (1991).
The developments in employment discrimination law in the 1990's, coupled with the enormous
dislocation of workers by corporate downsizing during this period, have resulted in the growth in
employment discrimination cases continuing to exceed the growth in civil filings generally. See
also Peter Eisler, Overloaded System Tests New Strategies, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at 10A
(reporting that the number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal district court
increased a total of 109% between 1990 and 1994); Vince Bielski, Age Bias Suits Up With
Downsizing, 109 Los ANGELES DAILY J. 1 (1996).
6. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer can
absolve itself of vicarious liability from a hostile environment claim if it "has taken energetic
measures to discourage sexual harassment in the work place and has established, advertised and
enforced effective procedures to deal with it when it does occur.").
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financial, including the effect of claims on employee morale, recruitment
of new employees, and public perception of the business. This more
amorphous interest driving risk management may require the employer
to act affirmatively in ways that extend beyond limiting the legal liabil-
ity and attendant financial costs caused by discriminatory behavior.
Sophisticated employers generally rely on a number of different
risk management techniques. These techniques are both proactive and
reactive in nature. For example, a risk-averse employer will often for-
mulate corporate policies and procedures designed to ensure that all
decisions about the terms and conditions of employment will be non-
discriminatory. Such proactive strategies can run the gamut from edu-
cating managers and workers about behavior in the workplace that is
proscribed by law, to more ambitious efforts to create a diverse work-
place in which all employees feel free of discriminatory animus. Addi-
tionally, employers attempt to react to employee grievances in a manner
that reduces the potential of suffering the expense and disruption of liti-
gation. For example, many employers now mandate arbitration of
employment disputes in accordance with a sophisticated internal griev-
ance procedure in an effort to rapidly settle plausible claims. An impor-
tant component of most risk management programs is liability insurance,
which provides for a legal defense of lawsuits and payment of judg-
ments and settlements within the scope of coverage that the employer
might suffer. This article analyzes the increasing reliance by employers
on liability insurance to manage the risk of employment discrimination
liabilities, and predicts some of the consequences of this emerging trend.
It bears repeating that insurance coverage is only part of the risk
management program that should be used to manage the risk arising out
of employment-related practices. In light of the expansive motivations
and goals of risk management described above, corporate employers
likely desire far more than litigation services, since the very presence of
discrimination claims signals that a given work site may not be as pro-
ductive as possible. Moreover, insurance may not even be the most
desirable technique for dealing with the threat of litigation. First, insur-
ance coverage will often be a disputed matter, leading to uncertainty and
perhaps to increased transaction costs in dealing with employment
claims. Additionally, insurance defense counsel retained by the insur-
ance carrier may conduct the litigation in a manner that conflicts with
the employer's broader human resources strategy for dealing with
employee grievances. This is particularly true when the aggrieved
employee is primarily seeking reinstatement with the employer; the
employer may desire to settle the matter for a much higher cash payment
without reinstatement, while the insurer may be interested in obtaining
[Vol. 52:1
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the most cost effective resolution of the case. Finally, an insurer's
underwriters may refuse to continue coverage for a reasonable price if
the employer submits an inordinate number of employment-related
claims within a particular period.
On the other hand, insurance coverage might afford far more in
terms of risk management than simply defending claims and paying
losses. Depending on the importance to the insurer of the employer's
account, the employer may be able to secure the insurer's agreement to
establish a loss prevention and claim settlement procedure that would
allow the employer to participate actively in risk management at every
stage. Needless to say, the employer's counsel should work together
with the insurer in this regard; if possible, the employer might insist that
an on-going risk management committee (composed of counsel and
claims and loss control personnel from the insurer and the employer's
human resource managers) coordinate the risk management strategies
relating to employment practices. Such coordination would involve the
employer, rather than subjecting it to an insurer that reacts according to
its own interests when problems arise. In so doing, the employer could
take advantage of the insurer's risk management expertise and integrate
insurance coverage with broader strategies and techniques. These addi-
tional "oversight" benefits of insurance coverage have been acknowl-
edged by both courts and regulators.7 In one case, an Illinois court held
that the insured employer could lose claimed coverage by failing to sat-
isfy the notice conditions of the policy, even though the insurer was not
obligated under the policy to provide a legal defense of the claim.' The
court based its ruling on the assumption that the insurer might want to
start a loss prevention program with the insured immediately upon
receiving notice of the claim in order to reduce the likelihood of any
7. The New York Department Of Insurance reversed its longstanding prohibition on
insurance coverage of discrimination actions and decided to permit coverage of disparate impact
liabilities, in part, because the Department believed that public policy would be furthered by the
beneficial effects of loss prevention programs. See American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1996). In its holding, the court quotes from the
Department's Circular Letter No. 6 (May 31, 1994): "By bringing to employers' attention
practices that can potentially result in unlawful discrimination, insurer's loss prevention programs
and underwriting standards should discourage such practices. Any employer who does not
diligently attempt to modify employment procedures accordingly may well be denied insurance
coverage." Similarly, in a wrongful discharge case, an Illinois Appellate Court acknowledged that
permitting employers to insure against employment-related liabilities would further the public
interest in reducing unfair or abusive treatment in the workplace. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 846, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("Having a third party, with an economic
interest to protect, oversee the actions of the employer could be very beneficial to the employee
and society."), afftd, 641 N.E.2d 395 (Il. 1994).
8. See University of Illinois v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1355 (I11. App. Ct.
1992).
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future claims.9
As employment discrimination litigation has become more preva-
lent and more expensive, many employers have responded by aggres-
sively claiming that their liability insurance provides coverage for these
disputes. It is not unusual for employers to seek insurance coverage of
these claims, especially since the "first liability insurance policies ...
were purchased by employers as protection against tort liability to
employees resulting from work injuries,""0 prior to the adoption of
workers' compensation legislation. Defense counsel, whether in-house
counsel supervising litigation or outside counsel retained by the
employer to defend the suit, play an important role in assisting clients to
identify potential insurance coverage for discrimination claims. More-
over, as the insurance industry reacts to the greatly expanding liabilities
it faces in connection with providing coverage for discrimination suits
by excluding such suits from coverage under general liability policies, a
number of insurers have developed, and are now aggressively market-
ing, a new liability insurance product designed specifically to provide
coverage for these liabilities. Consequently, counsel to the employer
should play a role in determining which products best cohere with the
employer's broader risk management strategies and human resources
philosophies.
This article discusses insurance coverage of employment discrimi-
nation claims under both existing policies and emerging Employment
Practices Liability Insurance policies: The first part describes the "three
9. See id.
10. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a) (student ed. 1988). See
C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKER'S COMPENSATION 3-4
(1969) (asserting that an 1886 employer's tort liability policy was the first instance of liability
insurance in America).
For a good overview of the many issues arising in connection with insurance coverage of
employment disputes generally, see Symposium: Insurance Coverage of Employment Disputes,
18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1-269 (1996). See also WAYNE E. BORGEEST & PATRICK M. KELLY,
EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INSURANCE COVERAGE
(Practicing Law Institute 1995); PAUL E.B. GLAD & RICHARD V. Rupp, EMPLOYMENT-RELATED
LIABILITY CLAIMS AND INSURANCE (Practicing Law Institute 1995); Irene A. Sullivan & Adam C.
Rosenberg, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Termination and Employment Discrimination
Claims, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION (Practicing Law Institute 1994); Kearney W.
Kilens, Employer Insurance Coverage for Employment Litigation, 79 ILL. B.J. 32 (1991); Robert
A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Employment Practices
Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW. 689 (1994); John E. Peer & Ronald E.
Mallen, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Termination Actions,
55 DEF. COUNS. J. 12 (1988); Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful
Employment Practices, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1995); David M. Spector & David B. Ritter,
Insurance Coverage of Employee Claims Against Employers, 5 LAB. LAW. 615 (1989); Richard L.
Suter, Insurance Coverage of Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and Other Employment-Related
Claims, 11 ME. B.J. 82 (1996).
[Vol. 52:1
1997] INSURANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 7
dimensional model" of liability insurance; the second part describes gen-
eral principles of interpretation as applied by courts to insurance poli-
cies; and the third part describes public policy limitations on the
interpretation of insurance policies. These first three sections establish
the background necessary for analyzing the availability of insurance
coverage for employment disputes. The fourth part of the article then
analyzes the potential for coverage under standard types of liability
insurance, while the fifth part describes the duties which arise in the
event of coverage. Finally, the last part describes the relevant considera-
tions that a discrimination claimant may wish to take into account when
framing a complaint against the employer. The article concludes by sug-
gesting that the coverage battles of the 1990's may slowly wind down,
but that equally interesting and difficult issues may arise under newer
policy forms. Additionally, I suggest that the existence of insurance
may have a more profound regulative effect on the behavior of employ-
ers than the anti-discrimination statutes that create the underlying
liability.
II. THE "THREE DIMENSIONS" OF LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE
It is impossible to examine the potential for insurance coverage
competently without drawing upon a detailed understanding of substan-
tive employment discrimination law and the specifics of the claims
being asserted against the employer. Reviewing the relevant insurance
policies is complicated by the fact that a number of common liability
policies might provide coverage when an employer faces an employ-
ment-related claim of discrimination.' This section provides a brief
overview of the liability policies that potentially afford coverage for
claims of employment discrimination.
In order to identify relevant liability insurance policies, employ-
ment discrimination lawyers must understand the three-dimensional
model of insurance coverage that operates in many cases. First, the
employer's liability insurance program has a "width," comprised of a
number of different kinds of policies that provide primary insurance
coverage. Second, the liability program has a "height," defined by the
different economic levels of coverage provided by various insurance
products. Finally, the liability program has a "length," consisting of an
historical succession of policies owned by the employer during the time
period implicated by the allegations in the complaint. To assess the
11. Professor Kenneth Abraham analyzed the general problem in the insurance market of the
"heavy reliance on so many different forms of insurance and of the relatively disorganized way in
which all this coverage has come into being." KENNETH S. ABRAHAm, DiSTIBUtN G RiSK 133-72
(1986).
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potential for insurance coverage of a particular claim of employment
discrimination, the employment lawyer must fully examine the "three
dimensions" of the employer's insurance portfolio. A discussion of each
of these "dimensions" of the employer's liability insurance program
follows.
A. Primary Coverages
1. WORKER'S COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY
The Worker's Compensation and Employer's Liability ("WC\EL")
Policy provides primary liability coverage especially designed for
employment-related claims of bodily injury. In fact, this product is a
combination of two distinct types of coverage.' 2 Under the policy, the
worker's compensation coverage promises to pay all benefits due from
the employer pursuant to the governing worker's compensation scheme.
Worker's compensation statutes vary from state to state, sometimes to a
significant degree.' 3 Generally, these statutory schemes impose no-fault
liability on employers to pay death benefits, medical and rehabilitation
expenses, and/or lost wages to employees suffering injuries that arise out
of, or occur during, the course of their employment. In exchange, the
statutes insulate the employer from what would often be more expansive
tort liability.' 4 The Employer's Liability coverage, in contrast, promises
to pay on behalf of employers certain liabilities incurred to employees
that fall outside the scope of the worker's compensation statutes.
Most states adopt the standard form Worker's Compensation and
12. As one court recently summarized:
[E]mployers' liability insurance is traditionally written in conjunction with workers'
compensation policies, and is intended to serve as a "gap-filler," providing
protection to the employer in those situations where the employee has a right to
bring a tort action despite the provisions of the workers' compensation statute or the
employee is not subject to the workers' compensation law. Generally, these two
kinds of coverage are mutually exclusive.
Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1986) (citations omit-
ted); see also Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Iowa
1993) (noting that "[e]mployers' liability insurance protects an employer against common-law
liabilities for injuries resulting to employees. In contrast, workers' compensation insurance pro-
tects the employer against liability imposed by the worker's compensation acts.").
13. Several states still make the worker's compensation scheme elective for both employer
and employee, a carryover from the necessity to avoid constitutional challenge earlier this century.
See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.20 (1988).
14. See Suckow v. NEOWA FS, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1989) (noting that "[an]
employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up his normal defenses and
assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives up his right to common law verdicts.")
(citation omitted); LARSON, supra note 12, at § 1.10; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Historical
Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800-03
(1982) (offering an economic justification of the quid pro quo embodied in worker's
compensation acts).
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Employer's Liability Policy developed and maintained by the National
Council on Compensation Insurance. 5 Part One of the policy provides
worker's compensation insurance, and covers the insured employer for
obligations to injured workers arising under a state's worker's compen-
sation and occupational disease laws. 6 The policy specifically refers to
the worker's compensation statutes in effect for the jurisdiction and
promises to pay all wage loss and medical benefits that the injured
worker is entitled to receive under these statutes. 17
Under the policy, the insurance company has the right and duty to
defend the insured employer in the event of suit, or other action by the
employee, to collect on a disputed claim.18 By reserving a right to
defend, the insurance company maintains its ability to provide the
insured employer with effective defense counsel and to ensure that a
potential covered settlement or judgment is minimized. In turn, the
insurance company's duty to defend provides the insured an important
protection against the costs of litigating claims for benefits. This duty to
defend is an obligation equal in importance to the insurance company's
duty to pay the loss on behalf of the insured employer.
Not every claim involving injury to an employee will be covered
under Part One. Part Two, Employer's Liability, covers the insured
employer for accidents or disease which cause an employee's injury, but
which are not compensable under the state's worker's compensation
statute. 9 Ordinarily, when the employee is injured, workers compensa-
tion benefits will be the exclusive remedy for the injury.2 ° One type of
claim that falls outside the scope of the worker's compensation statutes
is injury or loss to the employee's spouse, including loss of consortium,
arising out the employee's injury.2' Claims asserted against the
employer by the spouse of an injured employee will be covered under
the Employer's Liability part of the policy. 22 These claims are asserted
in ordinary civil proceedings, as contrasted with claims for worker's
15. The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) is an organization that services
the insurance industry by developing and filing policy language, rules, and rates with state
regulatory authorities.
16. See JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4571, 4625 (Berdal ed.,
1979)
17. See JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7051
(1981); LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:36 (3d ed. 1995);
GEORGE J. COUCH, III, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 44:13, 56:51 (Ronald A. Anderson et
al. eds., 1982).
18. See COUCH, supra note 17, § 56.51.
19. See APPLEMAN, supra note 16.
20. See id. § 4571.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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compensation benefits that are ordinarily adjudicated in an administra-
tive forum.
Insurance policies, including the Worker's Compensation and
Employer's Liability Policy, contain exclusions which are designed to
bar recovery in some situations. Exclusions in these policies limit
recovery if there have been illegal or willful acts by the insured
employer. These policies also impose duties and conditions on both the
insured employer and the insurance company. While the insurance com-
pany has the duty to defend, the insured employer is responsible for
notifying the insurance company of a loss and for cooperating in the
settlement of the loss.23
2. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
The Commercial General Liability ("CGL") Policy provides basic
liability insurance coverage for various business entities and governmen-
tal units. The CGL policy serves as a general-purpose foundation for the
insured's liability coverage, much like the typical homeowner's policy
provides individuals with their basic liability coverage. For purposes of
employment-related claims, the CGL policy is fairly described as prom-
ising to pay, on behalf of the employer, the liabilities associated with
bodily injuries and property damage for which the insured is liable.24
The Insurance Services Office's ("ISO") 25 CGL policy, adopted in
October of 1993, follows a straightforward format. Section I sets forth
the coverages provided by the policy. Each coverage is stated in terms
of an "insuring agreement" that defines the grant of coverage and exclu-
sions that limit the scope of the insuring agreement. Section II defines
the persons and entities who are insured under the policy. Section III
defines the limits of insurance, as expressed in the dollar amounts set
forth on the "Declarations" page of the policy. Section IV sets forth
conditions of the insurance contract, including rights and duties of both
the insurer and the insured. Finally, and of great importance, Section V
provides definitions of the key terms used throughout the policy.
The CGL policy covers a wide range of liability exposures facing
23. See generally DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND RISK
MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 1996). The authors have prepared this two volume text as reading for the
course of study leading to the Chartered Property Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) designation.
CPCU is a widely recognized symbol of professional achievement in the insurance industry. See
also supra notes 16-17.
24. See Richard J. Fitzgerald, The ISO's General Liability Policy, J. Mo. B., Sept. 1987, at
383.
25. Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a national insurance industry service organization that
develops and files coverage forms, promulgates advisory loss costs, and performs other services
for and on behalf of its member companies. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 383, 387.
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businesses and other organizations, including "slip and fall" injuries suf-
fered by visitors to the insured's business premises, injuries caused by
the insured's products and completed work, and injuries resulting from
certain intentional acts of the insured's agents, such as libel and slan-
der.26 The CGL policy contains three grants of coverage: Coverage A,
Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability; Coverage B, Personal and
Advertising Injury Liability; and Coverage C, Medical Payments.27
These coverages are subject to exclusions barring recovery in certain
situations, 8 and limiting liability to a maximum dollar amount for each
occurrence. 29 The coverages are capped by an aggregate limit for all
losses paid during any annual period.3"
Coverage A is an agreement by the insurance company to pay dam-
ages to an injured third party on behalf of the insured for those "occur-
rences" (defined as "accidents") that trigger the policy and result in
"bodily injury" or "property damage" during the policy period. In addi-
tion to this occurrence "trigger," a "claims-made trigger" is available,
but only provides coverage if the claim for bodily injury or property
damage was first made during the policy period.3" Coverage A also pro-
vides that the insurance company has a duty to defend the insured in
actions brought by the third-party claimant. Because defense costs may
be a substantial portion of the insurance company's payout on a given
claim, this duty is an important feature of the coverage.
Coverage B provides coverage to the insured for certain intentional
torts it commits against others.32 These offenses typically include libel,
slander, and wrongful entry. Again, the policy pays judgments and
claims against the insured and defends the insured against actions
brought by third parties.
Coverage C provides a no-fault response to an occurrence for
which the insured may or may not be liable.33 Typically, this coverage
will pay the medical bills of someone who has suffered bodily injury in
connection with the insured's premises or business operations.34
One important caveat is in order. The ISO regularly amends its
26. MALECKI, supra note 23, Ch. 3, 4.
27. See James T. Hendrick & James P. Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability
Forms-An Introduction and Critique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNs. Q. 319, 322 (1986).
28. See id. at 343-68.
29. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 386; Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 27, at 335.
30. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 384; Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 27, at 333, 335.
31. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 383-85; Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 27, at 332, 336.
32. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24; Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 27.
33. See id. Fitzgerald, supra note 24; Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 27.
34. For additional insight into the design and content of the CGL policy, see Phil Watkins,
General Liability Insurance: What it Covers, 52 TEx. B.J. 898 (1989); Hal G. Block, Professional
and General Liability Insurance Coverage, 13 BARRISTER 31 (1986).
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standard policy forms and usually creates optional endorsements. Addi-
tionally, insurance carriers may draft their own policies or endorsements
that differ from the current ISO forms. Although the foundational legal
principles discussed in this article are unlikely to change in the near
future, the specific policy language used as examples may very well
differ from the terms contained in a particular CGL policy. The growing
body of case law interpreting the availability of coverage for employ-
ment-related disputes must be reviewed carefully, since the decisions in
many of these cases-even cases only several years old-are predicated
on policy language no longer used by many insurance carriers. When
analyzing a contract, painstaking attention must always be paid to the
precise terms of the contract before researching applicable legal
precedent.
3. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Another primary liability policy that may provide coverage for an
employment discrimination claim is Directors & Officers ("D&O") Lia-
bility Insurance." In some cases, claims made against a business by a
disgruntled or former employee will also include separate claims against
individual corporate officials.36 A D&O policy generally indemnifies a
company for any settlements, judgments, and expenses incurred result-
ing from claims premised on wrongful acts committed by its directors
and officers acting in their official capacity.37 These wrongful acts
include bad decisions, error, and neglect in corporate matters that cause
third persons to suffer harm, particularly financial harm, but may also
include intentional acts.38 D&O policies may also insure the directors
and officers personally.39
Although there is no standard industry D&O policy form, most
insurance companies' forms follow a similar format. Coverage A
extends coverage to directors and officers for damages that they are per-
sonally obligated to pay due to their wrongful acts. Coverage B, called
"corporate reimbursement coverage," reimburses the corporation for its
costs in defending or settling claims against its officers and directors.40
Coverage is activated by a "claims-made trigger," and defense costs, if
35. See COUCH, supra note 17, § 44:397.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See MALECKI, supra note 23, Ch. 11; see also COUCH, supra note 17, § 44:397; Carol A.
Noer, Selected Cases on Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Law, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION 1994 (Dan L. Goldwasser ed., 1994).
39. See COUCH, supra note 17, § 44:397.
40. Id.
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covered, are included within the policy limit.4" Most insurance compa-
nies' forms do not include a duty to defend, and some forms do not
provide coverage for defense costs. The policy usually is subject to a
deductible and contains exclusions which bar recovery for certain
wrongful acts such as fraud.
4. ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
Errors and Omissions coverage protects accountants, architects,
engineers, lawyers, and other non-medical professionals for acts, errors,
or omissions arising from their professional duties. There is no industry-
wide standard policy, but most insurance companies provide coverage
for the insured's legal obligation to pay damages arising out of the ren-
dering of, or the failure to render, professional services. Defense costs
are covered within policy limits, and exclusions bar recovery for certain
acts, including those better covered elsewhere under CGL, Auto, or
Employer's Liability policies.42
5. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED PRACTICES LIABILITY
It is now general insurance industry practice to exclude liability for
employment-related acts, such as wrongful termination, discrimination,
and sexual harassment, from standard CGL and Employer's Liability
policies; nevertheless, an increasing number of insurance companies are
willing to write this coverage by special endorsement or separate policy.
There is no standard coverage form, but Employment-Related Practices
Liability ("EPLI") policies generally cover liability arising out of
employment-related offenses committed by an insured employer against
its employees.43 Coverage is usually on a claims-made basis, and
includes the cost of judgments or settlements plus defense costs. Some
carriers, however, are writing the policies as "litigation insurance"
which only provides coverage for defense costs incurred in employment
litigation." Exclusions may bar coverage for acts involving fraud and
bodily injury other than emotional distress, mental anguish, or
humiliation.45
41. Id.
42. See MALECKI, supra note 23, at Ch. 10; see also APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 17,
§ 5256; COUCH, supra note 17, § 48:166; DAVID W. ICHEL, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
PROBLEMS OF AroRNmys, ACCOUNTANTS, AND INSURANCE BROKERS (1984) (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 260, 1984).
43. See MALEcri, supra note 23, Ch. 11; see also Karen Gordon, Overview of Employment
Practices Liability and EPLI Market Survey, in EMPLOYMENT LAW LIABILITY CLAIMS 253, 258
(Wayne E. Borgeest & Patrick M. Kelly eds., 1995).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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6. ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
Certain risks, such as liability incurred by a business on account of
the negligent operation of its automobiles, are covered by separate poli-
cies premised on different underwriting and pricing. The Business Auto
Policy covers insured employers for their liability and defense costs aris-
ing out of the use of a covered automobile.46 Should liability be
imputed to an employer for sexual harassment of an employee carried
out by the use of a company car, coverage under this kind of policy is
potentially triggered.47 Even more specific is Pension and Welfare Fund
Fiduciary Liability Insurance, which insures pension and welfare benefit
plans, administrators, and trustees against suits alleging wrongful acts in
connection with the operation of such plans. However, the narrow rem-
edies afforded to plan beneficiaries under ERISA,48 and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of such remedies,49 make it unlikely that a dis-
crimination suit would trigger coverage under this kind of policy.50
Finally, most individuals have homeowners' policies that afford personal
liability coverage. When a discrimination plaintiff alleges counts
against individual agents and employees of the employer, it is prudent
for these individuals to assess potential coverage under their personal
liability products. However, because homeowners' policies generally
exclude liabilities incurred by the individual in the course of business
pursuits, there is often no potential for coverage.'
In summary, a number of different policies or endorsements provid-
46. See MALECKI, supra note 23, Ch. 5; see also APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 17,
§§ 4311, 4451, 4452, 7049; COUCH, supra note 17, § 45:1.
47. See, e.g., Edquist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. C6-95-111 l, 1995 WL 635179, at *2-3
(Minn. Ct. App., Oct. 31, 1995) (rejecting the insured's argument that a claim filed by a female
employee, that its area manager sexually assaulted and harassed her in a company car, triggered
coverage under its company auto policy because there was no "occurrence" as required by the
policy).
48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994). An employee will often only be awarded wrongfully withheld benefits, see Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1985), and its developing progeny, and these
payments would be outside the scope of covered losses.
49. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins., 473 U.S. at 146-48.
50. See, e.g., Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 477 S.E.2d 59, 67 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996) (defining "personal injury" to include discrimination in the Employee Benefits
Liability Insurance section of the Broad form policy did not afford coverage for employment
discrimination claims under this section); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l. Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp.
1540, 1551 (D. Kan. 1993) (granting summary judgment to an insurer facing a claim for coverage
by an employer sued for discriminatory termination, because the employee benefit program
liability endorsement coverage provided coverage only for negligent administration of the plan,
not for discriminatory termination).
51. See Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(denying defendant coverage under his homeowner's policy when he was sued for sexual
harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, since the allegations fell within the
"business pursuit liability" exclusion).
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ing primary liability insurance will potentially provide coverage for
claims of employment discrimination. Counsel assisting an employer in
reviewing its liability coverage must fully review the applicable "width"
of the employer's primary insurance protection.
B. Excess Coverages
There are two principle kinds of excess coverage: "umbrella"
excess coverage and "follow form" excess coverage. Both products are
designed to add "height" to an insured's liability program by extending
coverage above the limits provided in the underlying primary coverages.
The underwriting involved in these products is distinct, since the pri-
mary coverages will usually be sufficient to handle claims brought
against the insured. Consequently, excess policies are often purchased
from a separate insurer that is competing aggressively in the excess
market.
The umbrella policy serves two purposes: to extend coverage above
the limits of insurance provided in the underlying primary policies, and
to offer coverage not available in the underlying policies. Although
there is no standard umbrella coverage form, most insurance companies
write this coverage for their commercial insureds. Most policies afford
defense coverage in addition to a comprehensive grant of liability cover-
age that will pay the portion of judgments and settlements in excess of
amounts paid by the underlying policies. Umbrella policies cover dam-
ages for which the insured is liable on account of bodily injury, property
damage, personal injury, and advertising injury arising out of an occur-
rence. Coverage is also available with a claims-made "trigger." Some
standard exclusions appearing in CGL and other underlying policies are
omitted from umbrella policies, or made less restrictive, in order to
broaden the umbrella coverage to fill coverage gaps in the underlying
policies. If an umbrella policy covers an occurrence not covered by the
underlying policies, the umbrella policy will "drop down" and provide
primary coverage for the claim, including a defense of the action.52 In
these circumstances, the policy generally will provide coverage only
over a "retained limit" or "self-insured retention," which is equivalent to
a deductible.53 Because the insurance carriers participating in this mar-
ket have developed their own policy forms, any umbrella policy must be
reviewed carefully to determine if this "drop down" coverage exists,
52. See Dixon Distrib. Co., 612 N.E.2d at 849-50 (court described the "unique and special
coverage" afforded by an umbrella policy by noting that "under certain circumstances, the policy
acts as primary insurance, where there is coverage under the [umbrella] policy but not under any
other regular primary policy issued" to the employer).
53. MALECKi, supra note 23, Ch. 13; see APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 17, § 4909.85;
COUCH, supra note 17, § 51:36.
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especially if no potential coverage exists under the employer's primary
liability insurance policies.5"
"Follow Form" Excess Liability Policies generally provide cover-
age under the same terms as the primary policy for liability in excess of
those policy limits. The typical Excess Policy will use, or refer to, the
same policy language as that in the underlying CGL, Business Auto,
Employers Liability or other primary policy. Some Excess Policies,
however, may contain their own self-contained policy language modify-
ing or deleting defense costs and other coverages contained in the stan-
dard underlying policies." As with umbrella policies, there is no
standard coverage form.
Many businesses purchase one or more levels of coverage to sup-
plement their primary liability coverages. These levels of coverages and
their inter-relationship are best illustrated with an example. Assume that
a company has purchased a CGL policy that includes a $25,000 deducti-
ble and a policy limit of $500,000, excess coverage for liability between
$500,000 and $1 million, and umbrella coverage up to a limit of $10
million. If an employee recovers a $2 million verdict, all of which is
covered under each of these liability policies, the employer would pay
the $25,000 deductible, the CGL carrier would pay $475,000, the excess
carrier would pay $500,000, and the umbrella carrier would pay $1 mil-
lion. Because discrimination claims may result in large verdicts, and
because an umbrella policy may provide coverage of a suit outside the
scope of the primary liability policies, it is important to investigate the
full "height" of the employer's insurance coverage.
C. Time Dimension of Coverages
Collecting and reviewing the relevant policies that potentially pro-
vide coverage for employment discrimination claims is further compli-
cated if the employee alleges continuing discriminatory acts by the
employer over a period of several years. Because policy forms change
with some frequency, it is necessary to gather all policies potentially
triggered by the allegations and examine them closely for differences in
54. In a number of cases employers have sought coverage for employment disputes from their
umbrella carrier. See, e.g., Jostens Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995); Dixon Distrib. Co., 641 N.E.2d at 397-98; Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co.,
869 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assoc. Ltd.,
492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992). Although umbrella policies are often sold by a different carrier
than the carrier providing the relevant primary coverage (reflecting the different underwriting and
marketing involved), umbrella coverage sometimes is added to the underlying policy as an
endorsement. See American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804
(Sup. Ct. 1996) (interpreting a general liability policy with a drop-down umbrella endorsement).
55. See MALECKI, supra note 23, Ch. 13.
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the coverage they each provide. One substantial difference that may
exist between coverages is the so-called "trigger" of coverage. Some
policies insure against liability arising as a result of events that cause
injury during the policy period; these policies are known as "occur-
rence"-based insurance. In contrast, other policies insure against claims
that are made during the policy period; these policies are known as
"claims-made" insurance.
Under standard occurrence coverage policies, each and every pol-
icy in force at the time that covered injuries occur potentially provides
coverage for the claim. Therefore, it is important to identify the time
periods during which the alleged injuries occurred and to review all lia-
bility policies in force during this period, regardless of whether different
policies are in force at the time the claim for coverage is asserted. In
response to the long "tail" of liability facing carriers utilizing occurrence
coverage, some insurers recently began issuing liability policies that pro-
vide only claims-made coverage. 6 In its pure form, the coverage trigger
for this more restrictive policy is a claim made against the insured, dur-
ing the policy term for an occurrence, taking place during the policy
term. Generally, however, coverage is expanded to include claims aris-
ing out of occurrences taking place on or after the "retroactive date"
specified in the policy. Additionally, many policies provide coverage
for claims made during an "extended reporting period," which extends
beyond the normal expiration of the policy.
A simple example illustrates the distinction between occurrence
and claims-made coverage. Assume that an employer is sued in 1994
for discriminatory behavior allegedly occurring since 1992, as can be the
case when an employee asserts a "hostile environment" claim only after
a number of years of enduring a discriminatory work place.57  The
employer should investigate potential coverage under any occurrence
policies in effect during 1992, 1993, and 1994, as well as under any
56. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 10, § 5.10(d)(3) (noting that in recent years "most
liability insurers have sought to expand dramatically the use of 'claims made' policies to liability
risks beyond the professional liability areas in which these coverages came to be used extensively
in the 1970s," but also noting the resistance to this move expected in the market). In fact, CGL
"occurrence" policies continue to dominate the standard market, notwithstanding the availability,
since 1985, of an Insurance Services Office "claims made" CGL policy. However, specialty
products, such as fiduciary insurance for pension plan administrators, are more likely to be written
on a "claims made" basis. See, e.g., Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp. v. Gavine, 763 F. Supp. 1073
(D. Idaho 1991), aff'd, 980 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1992). Although Employment Practices Liability
Insurance policies are still relatively new to the market and, therefore, still developing in response
to consumer demand, it is apparent that these policies will be written almost exclusively on a
"claims made" basis.
57. See, e.g., Maine State Academy of Hair Design, Inc. v. Comm'l Union Ins. Co., 699 A.2d
1153, 1155 (Me. 1997) (plaintiff alleged discriminatory acts and a hostile work environment
during her ten years of employment prior to being fired).
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claims-made policies in effect during 1994. As discussed below, claims-
made policies present especially difficult issues in connection with
employment discrimination liabilities because the policies often do not
define the term "claim," leaving it to the courts to determine if an
EEOC/state agency charge, a finding of probable cause, or the com-
mencement of a civil action is necessary before allegations of discrimi-
nation are regarded as a claim.
D. An Example of the Three Dimensions of Coverage
The following hypothetical demonstrates the significance of the
three dimensional model of insurance protection. Assume that an
employee alleges that she was subjected to harassment and discrimina-
tion by her supervisors and management since 1993. The alleged pattern
of harassment includes numerous derogatory statements made about her
in front of co-workers and customers, numerous instances of offensive
touching, and the maintenance of offensive working conditions in which
women felt devalued and ridiculed. The alleged harassment continued
until it reached an intensity that compelled the employee to resign in
order to escape the intolerable working conditions. At this point, the
employee alleges that she has suffered severe emotional distress that
manifested in a number of ways, including sleeplessness, weight loss,
chronic headaches, and fatigue. Upon resigning in February of 1996, the
employee requested severance payments under the employer's welfare
benefit plan on the ground that she had effectively been fired from
employment without cause. The plan administrator then denied sever-
ance based on a company policy formulated by officers of the company.
In 1997, the employee brings an action alleging that she was construc-
tively discharged due to the pervasive harassment, discrimination, and
defamation, and that she was wrongfully denied severance benefits.
If the employer purchased a reasonable complement of liability
coverages, this claim may extend across the full "width" of this insur-
ance portfolio by triggering the basic Commercial General Liability,
Employer's Liability, Directors' and Officers' Liability, and Pension
Fund Fiduciary Liability policies. Because more recent CGL policies
are likely to exclude discrimination and other employment-related prac-
tices from coverage with specific language, and because the other poli-
cies probably will not afford coverage in many instances, the employer
may be left without a plausible claim for coverage, unless it has
purchased an EPLI policy.
If the employer purchased a CGL occurrence policy from Company
A for two consecutive years beginning January 1, 1993, an occurrence
policy from Company B for the policy year beginning January 1, 1995,
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and a claims-made policy from Company C each year since January of
1996, there is potential coverage for occurrences under the policies of
Company A and B, and for the claims-made policy of Company C. The
"length" of insurance may then extend from the first occurrence in 1993
to the date of the claim in 1997. Every CGL policy during that span is
potentially involved.
If the basic underlying coverages fail to cover the claim, or are
inadequate to pay the full damages, the employer's insurance portfolio
will likely include excess coverage in the form of an umbrella policy.
The umbrella will supply the "height" in the three dimensional model by
providing limits of insurance in excess of those offered by the underly-
ing liability coverages. Additionally, if the underlying policies fail to
cover the claim, the umbrella may drop down to provide coverage to fill
the gap in the underlying portfolio of coverages, and offer the "height"
needed to meet the claim, even without the benefit of underlying limits.
Consequently, in this hypothetical case, it would be necessary to
review a number of insurance policies to assess potential coverage for
the claims asserted by the plaintiff.58 This careful review is critical,
especially in cases where the alleged occurrences reach back a number
of years and therefore may trigger older policies that do not contain
effective employment-related practices exclusions.
III. PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION: THE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOR
OF COVERAGE
Coverage is determined not only by interpreting the terms of the
insurance contract as written, but also by applying judicially-created
doctrines that may expand the insured's rights beyond a strict reading of
the policy language. As one leading commentator summarized,
"j]udges in insurance cases not only make insurance law; sometimes
they also make insurance."59 This section provides an overview of the
key principles that govern interpretation of the terms of an insurance
contract.
58. Cf. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324 (6th Cir. 1994)
(seeking coverage against seven insurers who provided a variety of policies during the relevant
period that the employee allegedly suffered injury); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v.
Everett I. Brown Co., 25 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1994) (seeking coverage under a liability package
which included a primary liability policy, an excess policy, and a worker's compensation and
employer's liability policy); Dixon Distrib. Co., 641 N.E.2d at 395 (claims for coverage under
four policies comprising a comprehensive commercial insurance package, including a primary
liability policy, an umbrella policy, and a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy).
59. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 101.
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A. Reading Against the Drafter ("Contra Proferentem")
If a written contract contains an ambiguity, it is a well-settled
maxim that the courts generally prefer an interpretation favoring the
party who did not draft the language in question. 60 Although not limited
to cases involving adhesion contracts, the maxim contra proferentem is
followed more rigorously when a significant disparity of bargaining
power exists between the parties, and the stronger party supplies all of
the terms of the written contract. This, of course, is the situation in the
typical insurance transaction, even in the case of a business entity
purchasing commercial insurance.61 Consequently, an employer assert-
ing coverage should prevail if it can demonstrate that one reasonable
reading of the policy provides coverage, even if the employer's interpre-
tation is not the only, or even the most, reasonable manner in which to
construe the policy language.62
This rule of interpretation provides one of the justifications for the
universal judicial practice of reading coverage provisions broadly and
reading exclusions narrowly. Courts uniformly read Insuring Agree-
ments broadly, reasoning that the insurance company has unilaterally
drafted the policy from a position of far greater sophistication and
understanding of the underwriting process than the average insured. The
following quote is representative of the boilerplate analysis used by
courts in assessing coverage: "Contract terms should be read as a rea-
sonable person in the insured's position would have understood
60. The maxim, omnia praesumuntur contra proferentem, is widely cited and is embodied in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
61. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 374 n.4 (1st Cir.
1991) (rejecting the argument that the University of Massachusetts is a sophisticated insured that
should not be permitted to invoke the maxim). Very large commercial entities (including, of
course, insurance companies) are sometimes able to negotiate insurance coverage in a manner that
more closely resembles contract negotiation between two parties having equal competence,
expertise, and bargaining power, in which case the maxim will have no application. See, e.g.,
Falmouth Nat'l Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (1st Cir. 1990) (general rules
of construction regarding insurance policies do not apply to a case involving a sophisticated
insured that had negotiated specific terms in the policy tailored to a particular risk).
62. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 10, § 6.3(a)(2). (noting that "[tihere are literally
thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance coverage disputes in favor of claimants on the
basis that a provision of the insurance policy at issue was ambiguous and therefore should be
construed against the insurer"); see also Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctr.
& Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a policy provides coverage for a
claim of sexual harassment when a "physical abuse" coverage endorsement renders later
exclusions ambiguous, since the court must adopt the construction of the policy urged by the
insured so long as it is not unreasonable); Trustees, Missoula County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Pacific
Employer's Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 1118, 1124 (Mont. 1993) (holding that a policy exclusion of
damages paid for sums owed pursuant to a contract was ambiguous with regard to the employee's
statutory claims for bad faith termination and recovery of lost wages and must be read in favor of
the employer).
[Vol. 52:1
1997] INSURANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 21
them.... The insurer has an affirmative duty to define coverage limita-
tions in clear and explicit terms.... An insurance contract is generally
liberally construed against the insurer."63
Insurers regularly define the scope of coverage in relatively inclu-
sive terms, and then set forth specific limitations on this broad grant of
coverage to tailor the risk assumed under the policy. Consequently, cov-
erage disputes often amount to a fight over the correct interpretation of
exclusionary language. Exclusions may be generally classified as serv-
ing one or more of the following interests: (1) designating certain risks
as better covered elsewhere, i.e., with a different insurance product; (2)
designating certain risks as insurable only upon the payment of an addi-
tional premium; and (3) designating certain risks as uninsurable in the
standard market, or in some cases, uninsurable in the insurance market
as a whole. Because an exclusion works to "take back" a grant of cover-
age, courts narrowly construe the language of the exclusion and may
shift the burden of proof to the insurer to prove that the otherwise cov-
ered risk has been excluded.64
Although in many cases the court struggles to find an "ambiguity"
that can be interpreted in favor of the insured, the maxim does not
empower the court to rewrite the policy terms. For example, in response
to an insured's argument that an ambiguity was created when the
endorsement to the umbrella policy that specifically excluded coverage
for discrimination inadvertently was not signed by the insurer in the rel-
evant year, a Kansas court concluded that the policy terms were clear in
light of the intent of the parties.65 The court concluded: "The general
rule that when an insurance contract is open to different interpretations
the interpretation most favorable to the insured must be adopted 'does
not authorize a perversion of the language, or the exercise of inventive
powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists."'66
Under the contra proferentem maxim, there is no basis for overriding the
plainly expressed agreement of the parties, as set forth in the policy.
63. Lapeka, 814 F. Supp. at 1544-45 (determining that unintentional discrimination may be an
"occurrence," but that the plaintiffs did not suffer "bodily injury" as a result) (citations omitted).
64. See Western Heritage, 45 F.3d at 88 (noting that under Texas law, exclusions are
construed even more strictly against the insurer than coverage provisions); Lapeka, 814 F. Supp.
at 1545 (noting that the distinction between coverage and exclusionary provisions is determinative
of the burden of proof under Kansas law); Motor Panels, Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., No.
91-CV-7198, 1991 WL 516545, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 1991), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir.
1993).
65. Topeka Tent & Awning Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 984, 986-87 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989).
66. Id. at 987 (citation omitted).
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B. Protecting Reasonable Expectations
Twenty-five years ago, commentators began to recognize that the
courts were interpreting insurance contracts in a manner that could not
be explained solely by the contra proferentem maxim. In a path-break-
ing article, then Professor Robert Keeton articulated the "doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations" to explain the interpretive approach increasingly
taken by courts since the early 1960'S.67 Judge Keeton summarizes the
doctrine in his treatise as follows: "In general, courts will protect the
reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds, and intended benefi-
ciaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even
though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such
expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer. "68 In
other words, even when the policy language unambiguously precludes
coverage, under certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage
exists.69
67. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 967 (1970).
68. KEETON & WIDISs, supra note 10, § 6.3(a)(3). For commentary on the doctrine, see
Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990)
(providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine is principled
and can be applied within justiciable guidelines); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations:
Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287-96 (1986) (formulating standards for
applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements to the doctrine in response to the fading appeal that
the doctrine holds for courts and commentators and contending that courts should "discard their
unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes of reasonable expectations without undertaking a
careful and systematic analysis"); Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation,
18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1113 (1992) (student note exploring the doctrine under Minnesota
law); Scott B. Krider, Note, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1984) (student note arguing that
regulatory efforts address the underlying problems in the insurance industry in a manner superior
to judicial use of reasonable expectations); William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1208 (1982) (student note arguing that "any provision which
undercuts the bargained-for insurance coverage must . . . [be] specifically explained to the
insured" to be enforceable); Stephen J. Ware, Note, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (student note providing a "law and economics" critique
of the doctrine).
69. Courts traditionally invoke contra proferentem with the caveat that the doctrine is not a
license for courts to rewrite the insurance contract between the parties. See Lapeka, 814 F. Supp.
at 1545 (explaining that a court may not "torture words in order to import ambiguity" into the
policy, nor may the court "make another contract for the parties. Its function is to enforce the
contract as made"). The doctrine of reasonable expectations breaks with this traditional limitation
on the scope of contract interpretation. As Professor Henderson correctly states, decisions that
rely on the doctrine of reasonable expectations "solely to construe policy language do not support
a new principle at all .... [T]he doctrine of reasonable expectations, if it involves a new principle
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Professor Kenneth Abraham has organized the "reasonable expec-
tations" line of cases in a persuasive manner by suggesting that there are
two distinct applications of the doctrine.7" In "misleading impression"
cases, the courts find that the insurer has influenced the insured in some
manner to believe that coverage exists despite the precise terms of the
policy. These cases represent a logical extension of the contra profer-
entem maxim by acknowledging that in some instances it may be unjust
to enforce even unambiguous policy terms, given the nature of the bar-
gaining process and relative bargaining strength of the parties.7
In "mandated coverage" cases, by contrast, courts determine that
coverage is desirable and will be imposed, despite the policy terms, in
order to effectuate a general goal of broader risk spreading. These latter
cases stand "as criticism of the insurance market as a whole,"72 rather
than an indictment of the insurer for misleading behavior and are best
regarded as judicial creation of insurance.
A good example of a court using the "misleading impression"
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is found in Clark-
Peterson Co., Inc. v. Independent Insurance Associates, Ltd.73 Clark-
Peterson suffered a substantial judgment in a suit brought by an
employee alleging a discriminatory termination on the basis of his alco-
holism. The policy provided coverage for "personal injury," defined to
include "[d]iscrimination or humiliation";74 however, the policy also
limited this coverage to accidents which unintentionally cause such
injury, and later in the policy excluded liability for discrimination "com-
mitted by or at [Clark-Peterson's] direction."75 The Iowa Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the employee's suit was
""not covered under the precise wording of the policy," since the discrim-
inatory termination in this case was an intentional act committed by
at all, may apply without regard to any ambiguity. It may affect the substantive provisions of the
policy, regardless of how the policy is drafted." Henderson, supra note 67, at 827.
70. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 104.
71. See KELrON & WIDISS, supra note 10, § 6.3(a)(4) (noting that Judge Keeton lists five
"pragmatic reasons why coverage limitations that conflict with reasonable expectations ought not
to be enforced even when the limitations are both explicit and unambiguous in policy forms," all
of which support the "misleading impression" cases). The reasons offered are: (1) insurance
contracts are complex documents that the average insured finds difficult to understand, (2) the
insured receives a copy of the policy only after purchasing it, when the motivation to read the
policy is minimal, (3) the insurer is able to exercise its expertise and superior bargaining power by
inserting specific limitations in the policy that work an unconscionable advantage over the
insured, (4) general marketing techniques engender expectations of comprehensive coverage, and
(5) the insurance policy is titled and structured to emphasize coverage and downplay exclusions.
Id.
72. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 109.
73. 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992) (en banc).
74. Id. at 676 n.3.
75. Id.
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Clark-Peterson.76 Nevertheless, the court found that the insurer must
provide coverage on the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
In order to invoke the reasonable expectations doctrine under Iowa
law, an insured must first demonstrate either that the policy is "such that
an ordinary layperson would misunderstand its coverage"77 or that the
insured's coverage expectations were fostered by "circumstances attrib-
utable to the insurer."78 The court found that the ordinary layperson
could reasonably expect coverage for such "an unusual and controversial
liability, liability which no doubt came as a shock" to Clark-Peterson,
given that the policy provided coverage for personal injury resulting
from discrimination.79 The court distinguished intentional racial or sex-
ual discrimination-conduct as to which no reasonable employer could
expect coverage-from intentional discrimination on the basis of alco-
holism, the conduct giving rise to liability in this case.8"
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the doctrine is limited in
scope, to the extent that bare reasonable expectations of coverage are not
sufficient, in themselves, to override policy terms.8" Although acknowl-
edging that the reasonable expectations doctrine "has become a vital part
of our law interpreting insurance policies,"82 the court stressed that the
doctrine "does not contemplate the expansion of insurance coverage on a
general equitable basis. The doctrine is carefully circumscribed; it can
only be invoked where an exclusion '(1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2)
eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant
purpose of the transaction.' '"83 The court held that Clark-Peterson was
able to satisfy the second test because the clear grant of coverage for
76. Id. at 677.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 678.
80. Id. at 678 n.6. The court expressed some sympathy for an employer who may have bona
fide business reasons to fire an alcoholic employee, albeit illegal and discriminatory reasons. Id.
81. See id. at 678.
82. Id. at 677.
83. Id. (citation omitted). The "misleading impression" cases probably encompass the more
extreme cases in which an insured argues that the policy is "unconscionable" or provides "illusory
coverage" for the premium charged. In Clark-Peterson, the court applied a test that sensibly
combined the interest in upholding reasonable expectations with the interest in precluding the
insurer from obtaining unconscionable advantages. Professor Keeton suggests that in order to
avoid claims based on either reasonable expectations or unconscionability:
[T]he insurer should be required to adopt measures which guarantee (1) either that
the purchaser has actual expectations consistent with described coverage because
the purchaser was made aware of the limitations during the marketing transaction,
or that it would be unreasonable for an insured to have expectations that are not
consistent with the insurance policy provisions, and (2) that the premium charged
appropriately reflects the actual scope of risk that the policy provisions define.
KEETON & WIDISs, supra note 10, § 613(c)(1).
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claims relating to injuries resulting from discrimination was later evis-
cerated, even if not entirely eliminated, by other sections of the policy.84
The court's rationale was premised on the quasi-deceptive (even if
benign) structure of the policy and the difference in expertise and bar-
gaining power between the parties.
To deny discrimination coverage in the present case would be to
withdraw with the policy's left hand what is given with its right. In a
fundamental sense, of course, this is the proper function of any exclu-
sion clause in an insurance policy. The reasonable expectations doc-
trine does no violence to this proper function by its limited intrusion
into it. The doctrine means only that when, within its metes and
bounds definition, an exclusion acts in technical ways to withdraw a
promised coverage, it must do so forthrightly, with words that are, if
not flashing, at least sufficient to assure that a reasonable policy pur-
chaser will not be caught unawares.
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a recognition that insur-
ance policies are sold on the basis of the coverage they promise.
When later exclusions work to eat up all, or even substantially all, of
a vital coverage, they cannot rest on technical wording, obscure to the
average insurance purchaser. At some point fairness demands that
the coverage clause itself be self-limiting.85
Although the court rejected a purely equitable approach, the "fairness"
of extending coverage beyond the policy terms was premised on the
court's belief that the insurer engendered reasonable expectations with
its policy format.86
It is useful to compare Clark-Peterson with Jostens, Inc. v. North-
field Insurance Co.87 In Jostens, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
rejected the employer's argument that coverage should be afforded
under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, based on its finding that
the discrimination "coverage" provided by the umbrella policy was
effectively negated immediately in the insuring agreement itself.88 The
84. Clark-Peterson, 492 N.W.2d at 678-79.
85. Id. at 679. See also North Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 1997 WL 599910, at *2-4 (6th
Cir. Oct. 1, 1997):
The umbrella policy contains a studied ambiguity written into the policy by the
defendant. Under Michigan law, ambiguous insurance policy provisions are to be
construed against the drafter and in favor of coverage . . . . [The employer]
reasonably expected that the Shellenbarger discrimination claim would be covered
by the umbrella policy .... [As in Clark-Peterson,] we are persuaded that the
defendant insurance company should not be permitted to sell [the employer] a
policy covering discrimination claims and then to refuse to cover garden variety
discrimination claims.
86. See id.
87. 527 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
88. See id. at 118.
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Jostens court held that the employer could have no reasonable expecta-
tion of coverage for discriminatory employment practices arising from
the insurance market generally, nor from the terms of the policy, since
the exclusionary language was included as part of the definition of "dis-
crimination" in the insuring provision. 9 In short, the court refused to
create insurance since the insurer did not contribute to any mistaken
beliefs that an employer reasonably could have held about the scope of
coverage under the umbrella policy.
A more traditional approach was adopted by the District Court of
Pennsylvania in Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co.9°
Although the umbrella policy at issue defined "personal injury" to
include "discrimination," a later exclusion withdrew coverage for any
personal injury arising on the basis of "race, creed, color, sex, age,
national origin," or "termination of employment."'" The court rejected
the employer's argument that the exclusion should not be given effect
because it defeated the employer's reasonable expectations, and
enforced the "clear and unambiguous" language of the policy.9" The
court held that clear and unambiguous policy language in these circum-
stances would be disregarded "where there exists evidence which dem-
onstrates that the insurer has either passively or actively misled that
89. Id. The court stated that:
[W]e believe that the policy's "except for" language immediately negated any
legitimate expectation engendered. Jostens could not have been under more than a
momentary delusion that the policy afforded coverage for the costs at issue, given
the juxtaposition of the exclusions to the policy's mention of discrimination; thus,
the reasonable expectations doctrine does not provide coverage.
Id. The court also rejected the separate claim by the employer that the policy provided only
illusory coverage for discrimination, holding that "the doctrine of illusory coverage is best applied
•.. where part of the premium is specifically allocated to a particular type or period of coverage
and that coverage turns out to be functionally nonexistent," or where the employer reasonably
believes that "some specific part of its premium was allocated to discrimination coverage." Id. at
119. The policy terms were enforced as written, because Jostens did not pay a separate premium
for the extremely limited discrimination coverage and because the limited nature of the coverage
was expressed in a manner that defeated any reasonable expectations that Jostens might hold to
the contrary. Id. Cf. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Peters, 21 Colo. 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (find-
ing that Educators Liability policy that extended coverage to allegations of civil rights violations,
but excluded coverage for intentional wrongdoing, did not violate public policy by providing only
illusory coverage since the policy specifically provided coverage for intentional corporeal punish-
ment that gives rise to allegations of civil rights violations); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters,
Inc. v. Everett I. Brown Co., 25 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Indiana law of
"illusory coverage"-limited to cases where a premium was paid for coverage that will not pro-
vide benefits under any set of reasonably expected circumstances-is inapplicable when the
employer is covered for many potential claims under the terms of the policy); Wayne Township
Bd. of Sch. Comm. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
90. No. 96-8481, 1997 WL 255483 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997).
91. Id. at *10.
92. Id. at *12.
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insured as to the scope of coverage provided by the policy,"93 thereby
counteracting the clear terms of the policy language. 94 The court in Duff
Supply appeared unwilling to consider the issue raised in Clark-Peterson
and Jostens: whether the very structure of the policy language can be
misleading to an insured even though the language used is apparently
unambiguous. With respect to this question, the result in Duff Supply is
at least questionable, since a later exclusion virtually eviscerated the
grant of coverage for discrimination.
These cases make clear that the developing doctrine of reasonable
expectations remains fluid. Consequently, courts in different jurisdic-
tions adopt differing approaches that can leave insurers and insureds
uncertain about the scope of coverage until the case has been litigated
and appealed. Although the "misleading impression" application of the
reasonable expectations doctrine provides employers with a powerful
tool to avoid a strict reading of the policy terms, this theory is not
unbounded. If the policy language and marketing techniques employed
by the insurer scrupulously avoid engendering expectations on the part
of the reasonable employer that the dispute in question is covered by the
policy, then the insurance contract most likely will be enforced as
written.
A more dramatic application of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine occurs when the court finds coverage despite the absence of any
misleading conduct attributable to the insurer. Professor Abraham con-
tends that the tremendous expansion of the insurer's duty to provide a
legal defense to the insured is an example of the "mandated coverage"
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.95 The duty to
defend assumed by insurers in many liability policies is fully discussed
later in this article, but this duty provides a good illustration, for present
purposes, of the broad implications of the "mandated coverage" applica-
tion of the reasonable expectations doctrine and the struggle of courts to
constrain the doctrine within reasonable limits.
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has held that civil
claims for bodily injuries resulting from the termination of employment,
including emotional distress that does not result in a physical disability,
are preempted by the exclusive remedy provided under workers' com-
pensation law.96 On the basis of these cases, a California Court of
Appeal decided that, when an employee sues for wrongful discharge and
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 110-12 (discussing the seminal case in this area, Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966)).
96. See Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Cal. 1992); Shoemaker v. Myers,
801 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Cal. 1990).
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claims damages for emotional distress caused by the termination, the
employer is entitled to a defense of the civil action by its workers' com-
pensation carrier." The court reasoned that the employer "could reason-
ably have expected [the insurer] to assert the bar of workers'
compensation as an affirmative defense in the underlying case."98
Because it is questionable that a reasonable employer would expect its
workers' compensation carrier to defend a civil suit in which the
employee makes no claim for benefits under the workers' compensation
laws, this case is best understood as mandating a specific kind of cover-
age not otherwise available in the insurance market-protection against
the costs of defending claims in civil suits that seek recovery for injuries
compensable only under the workers' compensation statutes. 99 This
case represented a dramatic expansion of the duty to defend provision in
workers' compensation policies.
The scope of the duty to defend under a worker's compensation
policy was finally resolved by the California Supreme Court in La Jolla
Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co."o An employee
of La Jolla filed suit alleging a racially discriminatory termination that
also amounted to an intentional infliction of emotional distress. La Jolla
tendered defense of the case to its workers' compensation carrier, which
refused to defend the action. La Jolla pleaded the exclusivity of the
workers' compensation remedy as an affirmative defense, settled the
lawsuit with its employee before the issues were adjudicated, and then
sought recovery from its insurer for breach of its duty to defend and for
indemnification. The trial court entered summary judgment for the
insurer, but the court of appeal reversed this judgment and found that the
employer was entitled to a defense.' 0l The appeals court expressed its
reluctance to impose additional burdens on the workers' compensation
system, but, nevertheless, found that the "wide-ranging obligation" of
the duty to defend compelled the result it reached since the claimed
injury of emotional distress "had the potential of coming within the
scope of the Workers' Compensation Act [and] this potential would in
turn give rise to a duty to defend." 10 2 The court reasoned that if the
employer successfully established that it did not discriminate against its
employee, but the employee nevertheless established that he suffered
97. Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993),
overruled by La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal.
1995) (en banc).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 1!, at 111.
100. 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
101. See 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1995) (en
banc).
102. La Jolla, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659, 661 (relying on Wong, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1).
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emotional distress as a result of the termination, the employee's suit
eventually would be reduced to a claim for benefits under the workers'
compensation statutes.10 3 Thus, the civil action raised the possibility
that the employee ultimately would be asserting a claim for benefits that
would be covered under the workers' compensation insurance policy.' °4
The California Supreme Court, en banc, reversed the court of
appeal and found that no duty to defend existed on these facts. 10 5 In its
opinion, the court distinguished the different applications of the reason-
able expectations doctrine regarding an insurer's duty to defend. First,
the court acknowledged as a general matter that the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured will be respected when the policy is "ambiguous"
due to the language used or its placement in the policy. 0 6 The court
found that the policy unambiguously promised only to defend any claim,
proceeding, or suit for benefits under the workers' compensation law,
and that the underlying suit did not seek such benefits.107 In short, the
court found that the case did not fall within the "misleading impression"
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
The employer explicitly urged the court to employ a broader test of
reasonable expectations by arguing that employers who purchase liabil-
ity insurance packages (including CGL and workers' compensation poli-
cies) are entitled to receive the "seamless insurance protection" that they
reasonably expect. 0 8 This more expansive claim amounts to a request
that the courts mandate coverage to "fill the gaps" in the insurance pack-
age, an invitation that the supreme court refused in this case." The
court found that the employer could not reasonably expect seamless cov-
erage, especially since, by purchasing several different policies, the
employer manifested its understanding that each policy was limited in
scope. 1 0 The court further found that the underlying suit raised no
potential for a covered judgment, since workers' compensation benefits
may be awarded only through the administrative process established by
the workers' compensation law."' To hold otherwise, the court rea-
soned, would amount to converting the duty to defend in a workers'
compensation policy into an unlimited litigation insurance policy:
There is always some possibility that facts alleged in one forum
103. See id. at 662.
104. See id.
105. La Jolla, 884 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
106. See id. at 1054.
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could, in the future, form the basis for a covered claim in a different
action. Were this the test, however, any judicial or administrative
action involving an employer-employee relationship could be charac-
terized as a "predecessor" claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Rather, the test is whether the underlying action for which defense
and indemnity is sought potentially seeks relief within the coverage
of the policy .... Thus, the Court of Appeal fundamentally miscon-
strued the kind of potential coverage that gives rise to a duty to
defend when it concluded that [the insurer] had a duty to defend the
civil action merely because [the employee] might, at some indetermi-
nate time in the future, file a workers' compensation claim that did
fall within [the insurer's] coverage. 12
In short, the supreme court rejected the "mandated coverage" application
of the reasonable expectations doctrine on the facts of the La Jolla case.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the broad duty to defend
under California law is premised on precisely the rationale that the
supreme court rejected in La Jolla: that the substance of the claims, and
not a third party claimant's erroneous pleading, should determine the
scope of the duty. 13 The opinion of the court of appeal in La Jolla,
then, appears to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine more consist-
ently with the precedents, and might be followed in other jurisdictions
willing to accept the far-reaching ramifications of the "mandated cover-
age" application of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The supreme
112. Id. at 1058.
113. The court claimed to follow the analysis set out in the seminal duty to defend case, Gray
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966), but there is no easy reconciliation of the two cases.
In Gray, the insured was sued for maliciously and intentionally assaulting the plaintiff, and
eventually suffered a plaintiff's jury verdict and an award of damages. Injuries to third persons
resulting from the insured's intentional acts were not within the scope of coverage of the liability
policy. However, the court held that the insurer breached its duty to defend, since the plaintiff
"could have amended his complaint to allege merely negligent conduct," thereby triggering
potential coverage under the policy. Id. at 177. There seems to be no principled basis for
distinguishing between the possibility that a plaintiff might amend a civil claim in light of the
insured's anticipated defense, and the possibility that a plaintiff might withdraw a civil claim and
refile it as a claim for worker's compensation benefits in light of the employer's defense to the
claim. More importantly, if the employer's claim is in fact subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the worker's compensation system, it appears only reasonable for an employer to expect its
insurance carrier to secure a dismissal of the improperly filed civil action (or certain counts in the
complaint) and to protect the employer's interests in the worker's compensation forum with
respect to such claims. For this reason, La Jolla is perhaps best read as a decision by the court
that it will not mandate litigation coverage when to do so would place enormous strains on the
already overburdened workers' compensation system.
For an approach that rejects the La Jolla supreme court decision, albeit in light of a different
statutory scheme that appears to require the worker's compensation insurer to defend a claim
mistakenly filed in civil court or to bear the full indemnification risk, see HDH Corp. v. Atlantic
Charter Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996), rev. granted, 672 N.E.2d 539 (Mass.
1996).
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court reversal arguably represents the judgment that the harsh reality of
the business and insurance environment in California should override
the extension of the reasonable expectations doctrine, which is to say
that the court declined to mandate litigation coverage in a situation
where to do so would cause more harm than good. Despite this apparent
resolution, there most certainly will be additional litigation in California
regarding an employer's ability to secure a defense from its liability car-
riers for employment litigation, especially since the La Jolla court was
careful to limit its analysis to the duty to defend under the worker's
compensation portion of the policy, and was also careful not to decide
the scope of the duty to defend under the Employer's Liability portion of
the policy.1 14
In summary, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is vitally
important to employers seeking coverage for discrimination litigation,
since a painstaking review of the specific language of many liability
policies will reveal that coverage is not afforded for many liabilities aris-
ing out of discrimination claims. However, it would be a mistake to
conclude that courts will disregard policy terms; therefore, it is impor-
tant for employment lawyers to determine which application of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine best fits the facts of the case and serves
their clients' needs.
IV. INTERPRETING INSURANCE POLICIES IN LIGHT OF PUBLIC POLICY
It is well established that courts will not enforce contracts that are
contrary to public policy, regardless of the parties' clear intent to be
bound to the contract terms."15 Insurance contracts are subject to this
general rule no less than other contracts." 6 This limitation on the par-
ties' freedom to contract is premised on the fact that a contract is never
entirely a private matter, especially if the contract is a liability insurance
policy." '7 By definition, a contract of liability insurance affects the
injured third party seeking compensation from the insured by providing
a source of funds to satisfy a judgment. Obviously, there is a strong
public policy in favor of ensuring that injured parties are compensated to
the fullest extent possible. The contract might also affect other persons,
however, if the existence of insurance encourages an insured to inten-
114. La Jolla, 884 P.2d at 1051. If Gray remains good law, these arguments should prove
persuasive, since the result in La Jolla is premised on the forum in which the complaint was filed.
Liability policies other than the worker's compensation policy, of course, provide coverage for
damages awarded in civil suits within the terms of the policy.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS §§ 5.1-5.9 (2d ed. 1990).
116. See COUCH, supra note 17, § 39:14.
117. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 114, § 5.1.
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tionally harm others by absolving the insured of financial accountabil-
ity.1 18 It is equally obvious that there is a strong public policy in favor
of reducing injurious behavior and requiring that certain wrongdoers
bear the full consequences of their actions.
The public policy defense, when used as a limitation on promised
coverage in an insurance policy, amounts to a decision on the facts of a
particular case that the public policy in favor of compensating injured
parties is outweighed by the public policy in favor of preventing future
injuries.119 Thus, courts deem certain claims to be uninsurable, despite
the undesirable effect of eliminating a source of funds to satisfy any
judgment obtained by an injured third party claimant. The general rule
in this regard, known as the principle of "fortuity," is that "a contract of
insurance to indemnify a person for damages resulting from his own
intentional misconduct is void as against public policy and courts will
not enforce such a contract."120 In this context, it is important to read
"intentional" narrowly. Many courts recognize that public policy does
not prohibit insurance coverage for all liabilities incurred due to inten-
tional torts, but instead precludes coverage only for liabilities arising out
of conduct intended to cause harm. Put differently, public policy is
implicated only when an employer seeks indemnification for injuries
that it intended to inflict, and not when an employer seeks coverage for
intentional actions that have resulted in injuries.121 If it is accurate to
say that courts "make insurance" with the doctrine of reasonable expec-
tations, then it is no less accurate to say that they also "unmake insur-
ance" with the public policy limitation on enforcement of policy terms.
The circumstances under which courts will void coverage on the
grounds of public policy have been carefully considered in a number of
cases involving discriminatory employment practices. These cases
118. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989) ("The
rationale underlying ... [the public policy doctrine] is that the availability of insurance will
directly stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the law."). Based upon this rationale, for
example, courts will not permit a party to insure against liabilities it incurs by engaging in
criminal conduct. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Baer, 745 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. See Ranger, 549 So. 2d at 1007.
120. Dixon Distrib. Co., 641 N.E.2d at 401. This public policy doctrine may be judicially
acknowledged, or in some cases, it is directly stated in legislation. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533
(West 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 47 (1994).
121. This distinction was drawn in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d
1324 (6th Cir. 1994), where the court interpreted the policy language defining a covered
occurrence as being neither "expected nor intended" as preserving "the element of 'fortuity"' by
preventing insureds from using liability coverage as a shield for the consequences of their
anticipated intentional conduct. Id. at 1331. The court distinguished this narrow limit on
coverage from the "broader range of losses" constituting intentional torts and held that the
employer's insurer must indemnify the employer for compensatory damages paid to an employee
after suffering a jury verdict for an intentional tort. Id.
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exemplify the fundamental tension between the two important public
policies at stake: leaving third party plaintiffs without recourse to funds
contractually owed the defendant employer, and permitting an employer
to purchase insurance against prospective liability for discriminating
against employees and applicants for employment. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,122 which prohibits various forms of employment
discrimination, poses subtle issues in light of two salient features of the
statute. First, liability may exist even in the absence of a specific intent
to cause harm by discrimination.1 23 Second, the statute is structured as a
public civil rights act rather than a purely compensatory scheme to aid
injured parties. Although the courts have had little difficulty in conclud-
ing that insurance coverage for unintentional "disparate impact" liability
is not precluded by public policy, the insurability of "disparate treat-
ment" discrimination has proved to be more difficult to resolve
satisfactorily.
When the underlying complaint against the employer alleges "dis-
parate impact" discrimination, courts generally hold that the existence of
liability insurance does not undermine the strong public policy against
discrimination embodied in Title VII.1 2 4 Thus, even in the face of a
statute precluding insurance coverage of intentional acts that had been
interpreted to preclude coverage for sexual harassment and employment
discrimination, a California district court held that the statute did not
preclude coverage of a suit alleging disparate impact discrimination. 25
Similarly, in 1994 the New York Department of Insurance clarified its
longstanding prohibition on insurance coverage for discrimination by
making clear that there is no public policy bar to insuring disparate
impact discrimination.1 26 Courts and regulators have adopted this same
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(6) (West Supp. 1993).
123. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the United States Supreme
Court held that Title VII was directed against discriminatory effects in the workplace, as well as
intentionally discriminatory actions by employers. Id. at 431. In the lexicon of discrimination
law, the former cases involve "disparate impact," whereas "disparate treatment" is involved in the
latter cases.
124. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980). The court stated
that:
We do not think that allowing an employer to insure itself against losses incurred by
reason of disparate impact liabilities will tend in any way to injure the public good,
which we equate here with that equality of employment opportunity mandated by
Title VII. To the contrary, the fact of insurance may be helpful toward achieving
the desirable goal of voluntary compliance with the Act.
Id. at 1188; Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
125. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 606
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (interpreting CAL. INS. CODE § 533) (West 1993).
126. See American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (Sup.
Ct. 1996) (analyzing the New York Insurance Department letter dated May 31, 1994), affd, 651
N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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approach when dealing with other anti-discrimination statutory schemes
that assess liability without proof of an intent to discriminate. 27
In contrast, a claim by an employee under Title VII that he or she
has suffered "disparate treatment" on discriminatory grounds necessarily
includes an allegation that the employer intended to discriminate.' 28
Some courts have concluded that insurance coverage for intentional dis-
crimination would undermine the strong public policy against discrimi-
nation. A leading case adopting this view in the context of housing
discrimination is Ranger Insurance Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc.129
The Florida Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging that a country
club discriminated against Jewish applicants, thereby precluding them
from purchasing a home in an area that required club membership, could
not trigger the coverage provisions of the club's liability policies for
reasons of public policy. 130 The supreme court employed a two-part test
for weighing the public policies at stake, first inquiring whether the
existence of insurance coverage stimulates discrimination, and second,
assessing whether the underlying anti-discrimination statute is intended
primarily to compensate the victim or to deter wrongdoing.1 3 1 Because
religious discrimination, unlike other intentional wrongdoing such as
assault and battery, does not yield substantial deterrents independent of
civil liability, the supreme court found that the existence of insurance
would insulate those persons wishing to "indulge their own preference
for discrimination at little risk to themselves."' 132 Moreover, the court
found that anti-discrimination statutes primarily are intended to deter
discriminatory behavior as a matter of civil rights law, and that
aggrieved persons would not be left without adequate remedy in the
127. See Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas., 930 F.2d 89, 93 (1st Cir.
1991). The court found that "intent" under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") included a reckless disregard of the employee's civil rights, and therefore concluded
that "Massachusetts public policy does not bar insurance coverage of an employment action solely
because it is found to violate the ADEA in an individual disparate treatment case." Id. at 93. As
explained by the court, "Massachusetts law only proscribes coverage of acts committed with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids." Id. at 92 n.3. See also BLasT Intermediate Unit
17 v. CNA Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 687, 690-91 (Pa. 1996) (holding that negligent violations of the
Equal Pay Act could not be condoned, but that public policy did not preclude insurance coverage
of the damage award); Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 252, 254 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that liability for failing to make a reasonable religious accommodation
does not require a finding of intentional actions, and so insurance coverage was permitted).
128. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (noting that
when claiming "disparate treatment," the employee has an affirmative burden of production and
the ultimate burden of proof regarding the employer's discriminatory intent).
129. 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989).
130. See id. at 1009.
131. See id. at 1007.
132. Id. at 1008 (quoting Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381,
385 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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absence of insurance coverage since most suits are brought against com-
mercial enterprises.133
Consequently, the supreme court held that permitting insurance
coverage of religious discrimination in housing would violate the public
policies and underlying purposes of the statutes in question. Although
Ranger does not directly consider the insurability of liabilities arising
under employment discrimination statutes, other courts have adopted the
Ranger court's analysis when considering whether disparate treatment
employment discrimination is insurable.134 Courts also have interpreted
state statutes precluding insurance coverage for intentional wrongdoing
as a direct statement of public policy that precludes coverage for dispa-
rate treatment discrimination.135
133. See id. at 1009.
134. See Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 1287 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1996),
rev. allowed, 934 P.2d 1125 (Or. 1997). Although not citing Ranger, a similar approach was
followed in Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 905 F. Supp. 1139 (1995).
After holding that the racial discrimination charge was excluded from coverage under the terms of
the policy, the court continued by declaring (in dicta) that insurance coverage for intentional
discrimination is void as against public policy:
Aetna argues, and this court agrees, that the public policy of the State of Rhode
Island as articulated in the Fair Labor Practices Act, militates against judicial
creation of a safe harbor within which Foxon may presumably violate the law at will
with impunity. Such a result would do violence to the public policy of the state and
eviscerate the statute's intended guarantee of a workplace free of discrimination.
Foxon comes before this court to seek, in essence, insulation from its own
wrongdoing . . . It would be a clear violation of public policy if businesses and
individuals could insure themselves against liability for committing intentional acts
of discrimination. This result would promote, rather than deter discriminatory
behavior... Foxon's knowing failure to address the blatantly discriminatory acts of
its employees should not be condoned by shifting the burden of satisfying
Hernandez's damage awards to Aetna.
Id. at 1146.
Some courts summarily hold that public policy precludes insurance coverage of disparate
treatment liabilities without providing any detailed justification. See Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distrib., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D.S.C. 1993) ("The discrimination that
Ms. Pressley complains of is not the type of action that an employer should be able to insure
against.").
135. See Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 698 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (interpreting CAL. INS. CODE § 533 which forbids insurance for willful acts as
precluding insurance coverage in a case involving egregious, predatory, and intentional sexual
harassment); B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 907-
09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that liability for disparate treatment employment discrimination
is precluded by the public policy embodied in CAL. INS. CODE § 533, as well as in the anti-
discrimination statutes); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D.
Mass. 1992) (interpreting state statute precluding insurance for deliberate or intentional
wrongdoing as precluding coverage in light of allegations that the insured flagrantly and
deliberately violated anti-discrimination provisions and government orders).
However, the legislatively enunciated public policy is not implicated when the potential for
disparate impact liability is raised in a complaint and the insured seeks a defense. In a recent case,
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Despite the Ranger line of authority, some courts have enforced
insurance coverage even for intentional "disparate treatment" of employ-
ees, finding that such coverage is not necessarily contrary to public pol-
icy. 136 These cases often involve variations of D&O or E&O policies
written for public school districts, which provide insurance for liabilities
arising out of "wrongful acts," and generally do not exclude intentional
wrongs. Because the very purpose of many of these types of policies is
to protect the public school from the substantial losses that it may incur
vicariously, and also by defending and indemnifying its employees for
their intentional wrongful acts, insurers must rely on public policy argu-
ments in an effort to avoid coverage obligations. A number of courts
have held that insurance carriers cannot rely on the public policy defense
to coverage in these cases, effectively rejecting the Ranger analysis. 137
the California Court of Appeal clarified the Coit and B&E decisions by noting that the policy
before the court specifically included coverage for discrimination, and the complaint did not
preclude an ultimate finding of liability under a disparate impact theory. See Melugin v. Zurich
Canada, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 784-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
136. See Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ga. 1978). The
court stated that:
The proposition that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against liability
under Title VII will encourage violations of the Act is based on an assumption that
is speculative and erroneous. ... Where a class of employees is entitled to back pay
under a court order and the employer is financially unable to comply with the same,
insurance would provide the mandated compensation.
Id. at 567-68. The court also noted that the insurer remains free to exclude such liabilities from
coverage, and emphasized that intentional discrimination was excluded from coverage by the pol-
icy terms in that case). Id. at 568. See also Clark-Peterson, 492 N.W.2d at 677-78 (utilizing the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to extend coverage beyond the precise terms of the policy with
respect to intentional discrimination on account of disability).
137. See, e.g., School Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844,
847-50 (6th Cir. 1990). In Royal Oak, the court expressly rejected the Ranger analysis, holding
that an insurance carrier is able to protect itself by excluding discriminatory conduct from
coverage, and that an empirical inquiry into the actual "stimulative" effect of liability insurance on
wrongdoing is too cumbersome to employ as a legal test. Id. at 847-50. The court further noted:
Perhaps the existence of liability insurance might occasionally "stimulate" such
a contretemps, but common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance
costs and the trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive
damages, would normally neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might
have.
Pace Professor Willborn, moreover, we do not believe that most courts would
wish to encourage litigation over the question whether particular insurance policies
did or did not have a stimulative effect in particular cases. The insurability of
"intentional" discrimination in a given state is likely to be decided categorically, we
think, rather than case-by-case.
Id. at 848.
The Royal Oak court cited an article by Professor Willbom with approval, concluding that
the presumption that liability insurance might "stimulate" future discriminatory conduct is
unfounded. See Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employmetnt Discrimination,
66 MINN. L. REv. 1003 (1982). Professor Willbom argues that insurance coverage should gener-
ally be enforced to effectuate the public policy favoring compensation unless the insured displays
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Of course, if the policy limits coverage only to negligent acts, then "dis-
parate treatment" discrimination will fall outside the coverage even if
public policy would permit it.1 3 8
The different result in these cases is not explained by the courts
using a different test, but rather by a different application of an agreed
balancing test: weighing the benefit to the plaintiff of permitting insur-
ance coverage against the harm to society of encouraging future inten-
a "calculating intent" to engage in discrimination based on the existence of insurance. Id. at 1027-
30. Thus, Willborn's proposal would appear to strike a middle ground between the presumption
in Ranger, that insurance will have a stimulative effect, and the presumption in Royal, that it will
not, or at least that carriers can avoid adverse selection by excluding intentional discrimination.
Royal was recently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in North Bank v. The
Cincinnati Insurance Companies, 1997 WL 599910 (6th Cir. 1997). The North Bank court rea-
soned that the risks of hefty premiums, bad publicity, and uninsurable punitive damages would
deter intentional discrimination, and that the public interest might be better served by making
funds available to victims of discrimination. Id. at *5.
For cases finding no public policy bar to coverage of intentional discrimination, see New
Madrid County Reorg. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Continental Cas. Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1241-43 (8th Cir.
1990); see also University of Ill. v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992). The court stated that:
[W]e find there is no Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused
by one's intentional acts except to the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be
the person who recovers the policy proceeds. The fact that many insurance policies
contain an exclusion for intentional conduct demonstrates insurers have not relied
on any broad public policy. Defendant could have included such an exclusion in its
BEL policy, but did not. This court will not rewrite the BEL policy to create an
exclusion.
Id. at 1351; Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515
N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994). The court expressed:
We do not believe that a school district will discriminate against its employees sim-
ply because it carries wrongful act insurance coverage; nor do we believe that
school districts carrying this type of insurance coverage have a license to commit
intentional wrongs. Accordingly, we enforce the contract as it is written.
Id. at 580; cf. Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding that coverage for sexual harassment is unambiguous under the "wrongful acts"
trigger and offering no discussion of any potential public policy bar to enforcement).
138. See, e.g.; Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of Am. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
761 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (D. Kan. 1991) (providing that D&O policy restricting coverage to
negligent "wrongful acts" provides no coverage for intentional discrimination, even though the
Kansas common law precluding insurance for intentional acts was modified by a statute
permitting coverage of punitive damages assessed against and insured vicariously for the
intentional acts of its agents); School Dist. No. I v. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929, 943 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that there is no need to reach the public policy issue when "wrongful act" is
defined in terms of negligence only), rev. denied, 662 P.2d 725 (1983).
Similarly, when the plaintiff is suing only for bodily injuries, an educational liability policy
(which excludes such injuries from coverage) will not be triggered, although coverage under the
insured's CGL policy may well be triggered. See Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v.
Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1211-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding CGL coverage was
triggered, but not coverage under an Educational Errors and Omissions Policy in a suit for injuries
caused when a school principal sexually molested a student).
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tional wrongdoing. 139 Courts permitting coverage reject the hypothesis
that discrimination will be reduced by denying coverage, and they
emphasize the desirability of compensating the victims of
discrimination.
In short, public policy does not prohibit an employer sued for dis-
crimination from ever obtaining a defense and indemnification under lia-
bility insurance. In fact, recent court decisions evidence a willingness to
permit insurance coverage even for intentional discrimination by agents
of the employer. However, if the wrongful act amounts to a purposeful
effort by the employer to cause injury to the employee, courts generally
will still refuse to enforce otherwise available insurance for reasons of
public policy. In such cases, however, the insurance policy will often
preclude coverage in unambiguous terms in either the insuring agree-
ment or the exclusions; thus, the public policy doctrine should only
rarely place an additional limitation on the scope of coverage.14 °
139. For example, the dissent in Ranger questioned the courts analysis in the application of the
rule rather than in the formulation of the rule itself. Judge Erlich first argued that an important
part of anti-discrimination legislation is providing financial redress to injured parties, stating that:
From the point of view of the insured, protection is the primary function of
insurance. From the standpoint of the victim, insurance affords financial
responsibility. Both of these are respected, desired consequences of insurance in
our society .... To say that the primary purpose of the imposition of liability is to
deter wrongdoers is unreal in this world of ours.
See Ranger, 549 So. 2d 1005, 1011 (Erlich, J., dissenting). He then argued that discriminatory
behavior would not be stimulated by the availability of insurance coverage, especially in light of
the possibility of verdicts beyond policy limits and the imposition of uninsurable punitive dam-
ages. Judge Erlich stated that:
Permitting insurance coverage in the factual setting provided in this case can under
no stretch of the judicial imagination encourage religious discrimination. . . . In
support, I would cite that libel and slander are intentional acts for which insurance
coverage can be obtained in the marketplace. The majority's porous analysis would
have us believe that this encourages libel and slander. If this were true, there would
be empirical data to support their assertion, but the fact is that there is none.
Id. at 1012 & n.3. The Royal Oak court cited Judge Erlich's opinion in holding that public policy
permitted coverage of intentional discrimination. See Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848-49.
One student author has suggested that the different applications of the general balancing test
might be captured in a secondary general rule that could synthesize the cases and guide future
decision making. He argues that employers should be permitted to insure against employment
discrimination liabilities premised on its negligent supervision of the offending employee, or that
result from imputing liability to the employer for the intentional discrimination of its employees.
Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional Employment
Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256, 1262 (1994). This principle might explain the difference
between Ranger (in which a private club controlled by the discriminating members was denied
coverage) and Royal Oak (in which a public school sought coverage with respect to liabilities
imputed to it for discrimination committed by an employee), by focusing on the fact that the
presence of insurance will stimulate wrongful behavior only when the insured entity is implicated
directly in that behavior.
140. In most cases, the intentional nature of the conduct will remove the case from coverage
under the terms of the policy, and so the public policy issue need not be reached. See, e.g.,
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Even when a court determines that insurance coverage of inten-
tional employment discrimination is precluded by public policy, the duty
to defend the action under the policy is not necessarily unenforceable as
well. Courts have found that the duty to defend does not raise the same
public policy concerns as the duty to indemnify for damages awarded
American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (holding that California law permits insurance coverage unless there is a "preconceived
design to inflict injury," but that the policy in that case restricted coverage of intentional act to a
much greater degree); Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem, Co., 868 P.2d 510, 515 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that intentional discrimination is excluded under the policy); Daly
Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988).
A recent Massachusetts case underscores the importance of policy exclusions in this regard.
See Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial Ins., 633 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1994). In Rideout,
shortly after being ordered to pay claimants who alleged "disparate treatment" sex discrimination,
an employer ceased operations. The claimants brought a direct action against the employer's CGL
carrier to recover their judgment, but summary judgment was entered for the insurer on the ground
that the policy excluded coverage for intentional acts. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed on this ground, not reaching the question whether coverage would be precluded under the
statutorily defined public policy against insuring intentional harm. Id. at 379. It is conceivable
that the public policy balancing under these particular facts, involving injured claimants with no
other means to satisfy the judgment and a now defunct employer, might not void coverage had it
been available.
A similar issue arises when an insured seeks indemnification for the punitive damages
component of an otherwise covered loss. There has been a great deal of litigation regarding the
insurability of punitive damages. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d
ed. 1996). The author states that:
The debate is a vigorous one. Not surprisingly, courts are split on the question of
whether punitive damages liability for reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent
conduct is uninsurable. Roughly two-thirds of the states that have considered the
question have held that punitive damages are insurable, and the remaining states
have held that punitive damages are not insurable. Where punitive damages are
insurable, however, all states that have considered the matter recognize an exception
when the insured's conduct is intentional.
Id. at 475; see also Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages? Discern-
ing Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, Prag-
matic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L. REV. 455, 493 (1994) (surveying the
current state of the law and arguing that punitive damages ought to be insurable in many
instances); George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1009
(1989) ("Our courts conflict sharply: some deny coverage on grounds of public policy; the major-
ity allow coverage."). As Professor Priest notes, the increasing willingness to permit coverage of
punitive damages is directly related to the substantial expansion of the availability of the remedy,
to the extent that the traditional "requisite level of moral depravity to justify punitive liability" that
raises the public policy question in the first place may now be lacking. Id. at 1034. Given the
availability of punitive damages for some forms of employment discrimination, this question is of
significant concern for employers and insurers. Cf Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. S-W Indus.,
Inc., 39 F.3d 1324, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that an employer is not entitled to indemnifica-
tion for a $2.5 million punitive damage award, although the employer was entitled to indemnifica-
tion for compensatory damages awarded for an intentional tort). The Lumbermens court reasoned
that, because punitive damages are designed to punish and deter, public policy weighs much more
heavily against insurability than it does with respect to compensatory damages for intentional
actions resulting in harm. Id.
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pursuant to an anti-discrimination statute. 141 Other courts have held that
there is no enforceable duty to defend when coverage is precluded for
reasons of public policy, since the insured could have no reasonable
expectation of being defended in a suit that raises uninsurable claims.1
4 2
Of course, if the complaint potentially raises claims of unintentional dis-
crimination or other acts that fall within coverage, then the insurance
carrier will be obligated to provide a defense of the action, even if the
case ultimately ends with a finding of liability premised on intentional
discrimination for which coverage is unavailable as a matter of public
policy. 143
V. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DISCRIMINATION LIABILITIES-CASE
LAW ORGANIZED BY DIFFERENT POLICY COVERAGES
An insured employer facing employment discrimination liabilities
will generally have a number of liability policies as part of its "three
dimensional" insurance program, several of which may potentially pro-
vide coverage. This section of the article discusses the potential for cov-
erage under the most commonly owned liability products.
A. Worker's Compensation and Employer's Liability
Part One of the Worker's Compensation and Employer's Liability
("WC/EL") policy provides coverage for liabilities that the employer
incurs pursuant to the worker's compensation statutes in its jurisdiction,
on account of bodily injury resulting from accident or disease caused by
or aggravated by the conditions of employment. If an employee suffers
bodily injury in the workplace as a consequence of discriminatory
behavior and files a claim for worker's compensation benefits, the duty
to defend the worker's compensation action clearly is triggered, and any
resulting awards will be paid by the carrier. A much more difficult case
is posed when an employee seeks damages for bodily injury caused by
discriminatory behavior as part of a civil lawsuit against the employer,
141. See American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (Sup.
Ct. 1996); Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 930 F.2d 89, 95 (1st
Cir. 1991).
142. See B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 908-09
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting CAL. INS. CODE § 533); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins.
Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83-84 (D. Mass. 1992).
143. For a discussion of the duty to defend, which is broader than the scope of coverage, see
Republic Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), (interpreting
CAL. INs. CODE § 533 as permitting a carrier to assume the defense of an action that potentially
could result in liability for a non-willful failure to make a reasonable accommodation for an
employee's medical condition); see also Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792 (Cal.
1993) (en banc) (statutory bar applies only to indemnification for the intentional conduct, and not
to the duty to defend in a case that may involve some non-intentional acts giving rise to liability).
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since the claim may, in substance, be a claim for worker's compensation
benefits that is filed improperly as part of a civil action. Under these
circumstances, it is unlikely that the worker's compensation policy will
be triggered.
First, the worker's compensation policy is designed to pay only
worker's compensation benefits, which cannot be ordered as damages in
a civil action. For example, when a Hispanic employee sued for
employment discrimination, assault, failure to supervise, and failure to
provide a safe work site due to the physical intimidation he suffered, the
employer's effort to obtain coverage under its worker's compensation
policy was rejected." Although the related tort actions alleged bodily
injuries caused by the conditions of employment, the court held that
these torts are barred by the exclusivity of the worker's compensation
laws and the policy was deemed to cover only proper filings for
worker's compensation benefits. 45 Similarly, courts have held that dis-
criminatory terminations in retribution for filing a claim for worker's
compensation benefits do not trigger coverage under the policy since the
suit is not for benefits, but rather for damages arising out of a wrongful
discharge from employment.1 4 6 As discussed earlier in this article, Cali-
fornia employers were successful for a short period of time in asserting
that, a claim raised in the context of a discrimination lawsuit that was
potentially subject to the exclusivity of the worker's compensation sys-
tem of benefits, triggered the duty to defend under the worker's compen-
sation policy until such time as the claims in question were dismissed
from the improper civil venue. The California Supreme Court has now
definitively rejected this argument, but the same argument has been suc-
cessful in other jurisdictions with different worker's compensation statu-
tory schemes.147
Bodily injuries caused by some forms of discriminatory behavior in
the workplace may fall outside the scope of the worker's compensation
laws, eliminating any potential argument that the worker's compensation
carrier must appear and defend the civil suit until such time as the puta-
tive worker's compensation claims are dismissed. In particular, courts
have found that bodily injuries caused by sexual harassment fall outside
the quid pro quo of the worker's compensation system, in which an
employee gives up his or her right to sue in exchange for prompt no-
fault payments for injuries. This means that the employee is free to
pursue recovery in a civil action without reference to the worker's com-
144. See Bond Builders, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1390 (Me. 1996).
145. See id.
146. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Gaedcke Equip. Co., 716 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986); Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty-Mut. Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
147. See HDH Corp. v. Atlantic Charter Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 872, 874 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996).
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pensation system. 148 If an employee files a claim for worker's compen-
sation benefits on account of bodily injury suffered as a consequence of
sexual harassment, the worker's compensation carrier will be within its
right to refuse settlement of the claim and to seek dismissal on the
ground that the claim must be pursued in a civil action, even though this
defense works against the employer's economic interest.
1 49
Part Two of the WC/EL policy provides coverage known as
"employer's liability" insurance, which extends beyond statutory liabili-
ties for workplace injuries. Because this part of the coverage specifi-
cally provides coverage for civil actions seeking damages on account of
bodily injuries by accident or disease caused by or aggravated by the
conditions of employment, there is far more likelihood that coverage
will be triggered in a typical discrimination case.' 50 Pleading intentional
torts in conjunction with a claim of discrimination will likely avoid the
exclusivity of the worker's compensation system and trigger the
employer's liability part of the policy. 15'
In response to the growing number of claims under EL policies in
connection with discrimination suits, many carriers explicitly exclude
any liabilities for personnel policies and practices, including discrimina-
tion and harassment. 52 Express exclusions of discrimination liabilities
are generally enforced by the courts. 53 In light of this exclusion, some
148. See, e.g., Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 495 N.W. 2d 723, 729
(Iowa 1993).
149. See id. at 730 (holding that the carrier did not act in bad faith by refusing to settle and
securing the withdrawal of the claim for worker's compensation benefits by a harassment
plaintiff).
150. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southern Publ'g Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1990)
(ruling that allegation of assault and battery premised on an offensive touching in the workplace
that caused physical pain falls within EL coverage); NPS Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 517
A.2d 1211, 1213 (N.J. App. 1986).
151. See, e.g., Conrad v. Mike Anderson Seafood, Inc., No. 89-1481, 1991 WL 22925, at *8
(E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1991).
152. The standard exclusion developed by the National Council on Compensation Insurance,
Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy (April 1, 1992) provides that
there is no coverage for "damages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, evaluation,
reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination against or
termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions." This
exclusion is likely to pass judicial muster in most cases. See General Star Indem. Co. v. Schools
Excess Liab. Fund, 888 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (no duty to defend suit alleging
conduct intended to humiliate, harass and intimidate an employee, given clear exclusionary
language).
153. See Bond Builders, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1390 (Me. 1996);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Ottumwa
Hous. Auth., 495 N.W.2d at 729. Cf. B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9
Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the EL policy did not exclude bodily
injury caused by discrimination, but precluded otherwise available coverage on the grounds of
public policy).
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courts hold that separate allegations of bodily injury, in fact, pertain to
the measure of injury caused by discriminatory behavior, rather than to
the source of damages, thus, bringing allegations of tortious behavior
within any applicable exclusions for damages suffered on account of
discrimination. 154
Nevertheless, even this broadly worded exclusion is subject to judi-
cial interpretation. In one recent case, the court found that the exclusion
was designed to exclude coverage only for intentional conduct that
causes injury to an employee.1 55 Employing the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, the court held that the exclusion "does not specifically
exclude coverage for vicarious liability resulting from workplace sexual
harassment."' 56 Consequently, the court found that coverage existed for
the corporate employer to the extent that it was vicariously liable for the
intentional harassment and assaults committed by the company presi-
dent. However, the exclusion did work to deny coverage to the presi-
dent, who was also an insured on the policy. 57
B. Commercial General Liability and Excess Liability
The CGL policy is not an "all risks" policy that insures against any
and all claims and losses suffered by the employer. Instead, the CGL
policy obligates the insurer to assume only certain specified risks. Con-
sequently, the insuring agreement simultaneously grants coverage, while
also limiting it. The CGL policy consists of three separate grants of
coverage, the first two of which are pertinent to employment-related
claims. As discussed earlier, the insuring agreement of Coverage A
obligates the insurer to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property dam-
age caused by an occurrence. Each element of this grant of coverage
poses interpretive questions when an employer is seeking insurance cov-
erage for a discrimination claim.
Civil suits seeking redress for discriminatory employment practices
might not meet the coverage requirement that the employer must be sued
for "damages," since an award of back pay, reinstatement, and an
injunction as to future employment practices are equitable in nature.158
154. See, e.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 872 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994).
155. Schmidt v. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 72-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
156. Id. at 73.
157. Id. at 75-76.
158. See, e.g., Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905 F. Supp. 1139, 1144
(D.R.I. 1995) (no coverage for award of back pay and attorneys fees made by a state commission
in response to a charge of racial discrimination); School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos.,
488 N.W.2d 82, 88-90 (Wis. 1992) (finding no coverage for suit seeking injunctive relief
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As one court concluded, the "costs of compliance with an injunction
cannot reasonably be regarded as a sum payable 'as damages.' "59 On
the other hand, courts have read the requirement of damages broadly and
concluded that the term damages should be construed "in accord with
the plain meaning of the term and the reasonable expectations of the
insured" to provide coverage for back pay awards that technically are
equitable in nature.' 60 This latter approach appears to be the majority
rule that is growing in acceptance.' 61
The coverage requirement of "bodily injury," defined as "injury,
sickness or disease," is crucial in the discrimination context because an
employee may allege only economic, reputational, or psychic injury.
The traditional rule is that emotional upset resulting from discriminatory
treatment does not constitute a bodily injury unless it is manifested as
independent physical impairments, such as migraine headaches, sleep-
lessness, etc. 162  Some courts find that emotional distress caused by
physical abuse is an outgrowth of a "bodily injury," thus providing an
argument in favor of coverage in sexual harassment and discrimination
cases.16 3 A growing number of courts have rejected the limitation to
requiring reorganization and new hiring practices to remedy past discrimination, and attorney
fees); Maryland Cup Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 568 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (finding no coverage for suit seeking equitable award of back pay under
ADEA and Title VII).
159. School Dist. of Shorewood, 488 N.W.2d at 91.
160. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F. Supp. 1553, 1560
(W.D. Pa. 1987). Cf. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17 v. CNA Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1996)
(holding that an award of back pay under the Equal Pay Act is within coverage since the insured
experiences a real loss, rejecting the argument by the insurer that the employer is unjustly
enriched to characterize these payments as damages).
161. See James E. Scheuermann & John K. Ballie, Employer's Liability and Errors and
Omissions Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 18 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 71, 84
(1996) (advocating Liberty Mutual's rejection of the "hyper technical distinction" between legal
and equitable forms of relief and noting that the contrary approach is followed in a "distinct
minority" of cases).
162. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Dis., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 376, 379
(D.S.C. 1993); Kline v. The Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 129 (M.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 22
F.3d 301 (3d. Cir. 1994); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548 (D.
Kan. 1993); Steve Spicer Motors, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 758 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988); Presidential Hotel v. Canal Insurance Co., 373 S.E.2d 671, 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988);
Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 346, 348-49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
However, if the plaintiff specifically alleges that the discrimination caused her to suffer
"bodily injury" without further elaboration, then the insurer may not be able to avoid its duty to
defend, at least until such time as there is no potential for recovery for "bodily injury" as defined
in the policy. See Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1438, 1440 (D.
Mont. 1988).
163. See, e.g., Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205,
1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that allegations under Title IX that a principal sexually molested
a student in his office triggers coverage because a claim of emotional trauma caused by physical
abuse comes within the policy definition of bodily injury).
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physically manifested injuries altogether, reasoning that the policy defi-
nition of bodily injury does not require physical manifestation, and con-
cluding that emotional distress is as much an affliction of the body as a
physically manifested symptom. 6'
The "property damage" trigger almost certainly is not implicated in
a typical discrimination suit, since the discriminatory behavior does not
cause injury to the employee's "tangible property." Courts have uni-
formly rejected the claim that lost earnings due to discriminatory treat-
ment amount to property damage. 165
The policy definition of "occurrence" as an "accident" presents the
employer with a substantial coverage hurdle since discriminatory behav-
ior often involves intentional actions, such as setting wage rates, termi-
nating employment, and adopting corporate policies. The requirement
that bodily injury be caused by an accident is mirrored by an exclusion
of coverage for any injuries "expected or intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Courts often regard sexual harassment and disparate
treatment discrimination as intentional acts for purposes of insurance
coverage as a matter of law, regardless of whether the wrongdoer had
any subjective expectation of injury. 16 6 In the words of one court: "We
164. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cameron College, Inc., 1997 WL 567958, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 11,
1997) (rejecting a bright-line distinction between physical and mental injuries in medicine or in
law, and holding that a discrimination complaint alleging mental pain and anguish and
embarrassment falls within the "bodily injury" definition). See Scheuermann & Ballie, supra note
161, at 76-78.
165. See Jefferson-Pilot, 839 F. Supp. 376; Kline, 826 F. Supp. 123; Lapeka, 814 F. Supp. at
1549; Mutual Serv. Cas., 699 F. Supp. at 1442; see also Lamar Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Sentry Ins.,
757 P.2d 1143 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). In Lamar, the court reasoned that:
Here, the employees' claims were purely economic, and the trial court correctly
concluded that they did not constitute damage to, or loss of use of, tangible
property. Lamar's argument that federal reserve notes are tangible property is
inapposite, as there was no claim that the employees were deprived of any
particular, identified bills or coins.
Id. at 1144.
166. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wodarski, 68 F.3d 483 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that
sexual harassment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not
occurrences); Jefferson-Pilot, 839 F. Supp. at 380 (finding that a firing motivated by racial
discrimination is not an occurrence); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc.,
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 629, 632 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993); Sena v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 471 (D.N.M. 1992); Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp.
249, 254 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that sexual harassment is intentional behavior as a matter of law); Elliott v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that alleged "willful,
wanton and malicious" sex discrimination is not an occurrence); Northern Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 918
P.2d 1051, 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that sexual harassment and intentional
discrimination are not occurrences as a matter of law); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay,
Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding sexual harassment is not an occurrence as a
matter of law, regardless of the state of mind of the perpetrator); Rideout v. Crum & Forster
Commercial Ins. Co., 633 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. 1994); Jackson County Hosp. v. Alabama
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do not believe that an average person would consider intentional dis-
crimination to be an 'accident' or a 'condition which results in bodily
injury neither expected not intended.' Therefore, we hold that there is
no coverage."'' 67 When the insured did not personally harass or discrim-
inate against the plaintiff, but is legally liable for the actions of a non-
insured, courts still hold that the alleged injury is not an "accident" and
was "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured" if the
insured "knew or should have known that there was a substantial
probability that nonconsensual sexual contact was likely to result" from
referring clients to work with a third person.1 68  However, when the
underlying complaint alleges that the employer negligently responded to
the discriminatory situation, or when disparate impact discrimination is
the source of the claim, most courts have concluded that discrimination
can be an occurrence.' 69  Nevertheless, some courts have held that the
Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 619 So. 2d 1369, 1372 (Ala. 1993) (finding disparate treatment discrimination
is not an occurrence); Kline v. The Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 128-29 (M.D. Pa. 1993),
aff'd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Skapyak, No. C5-89-524,
1989 WL 84180 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989) (finding that alleged willful and malicious
discrimination resulting in demotion and termination is not an occurrence); Presidential Hotel v.
Canal Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding sexual harassment is not an
occurrence); Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 8-9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Daly
Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988) (finding
retaliatory termination is not an occurrence); Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d
346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are not occurrences); Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home Co., Inc. v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
446 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (finding disability discrimination is not an
occurrence), aff'd, 57 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1982).
167. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 777 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Or. Ct. App.
1989). But see Griffin, 1997 WL 56958, at *3-4 (denying summary judgment for the insurer as to
claims by the plaintiff that she suffered emotional distress as a result of discrimination on account
of her disabilities, since the record did not make clear an intent by the defendant to cause those
injuries); Maine State Academy of Hair Design, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 699 A.2d
1153, 1157 (Me. 1997) (reversing summary judgment for the insurer because, although there may
be an expectation of harm when engaging in sexual harassment, "bodily injury is not necessarily
expected or intended by the perpetrator of unwanted sexual advances and wrongful discharge").
168. American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. M.B., 563 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(agent liable for sending models to work with a photographer employed by a separate corporation
under the control of the agent, when she had reason to know that the photographer would sexually
assault and harass the models).
169. See Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., CIV. A. No. 96-8481, 1997 WL 255483,
at *13-14 (E.D. Pa. May 1997) (finding complaint, alleging intentional and reckless behavior
potentially, triggered coverage for sexual discrimination claims since "recklessness" is sufficient
scienter to impose vicarious liability under Title VII); Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v.
Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), (finding that an allegation that
school acted negligently when the principal sexually molested a student in his office was an
occurrence, since Title IX does not require a finding of intent for liability to attach); Ron Tonkin
Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 252 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), (ruling that liability
for failure to make religious accommodation for employee is an occurrence because it is not
predicated on an intentional act); Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1548
(D. Kan. 1993) (finding disparate impact liability qualifies as an occurrence); School Dist. of
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discriminatory disparate impact of an intentionally adopted and applied
employment policy is not caused by an accident.1 70
If an employer can demonstrate that it is subject to a suit seeking
damages for bodily injury caused by an occurrence, it has satisfied the
requirements of the insuring agreement. However, Coverage A also
contains a number of exclusions from coverage that considerably narrow
the scope of insurance. The most pertinent clause excludes suits seeking
damages for bodily injury to an employee arising out of, and in the
course of, employment. Most courts hold that bodily injury caused by
discrimination "arises out of and in the course of employment" by defi-
nition, and thus, is excluded even if the case falls within the coverage
provisions of the insuring agreement. 7 Courts frequently note that the
language of the exclusion is broad and unqualified, and does not, by its
terms, exclude only those claims subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the worker's compensation system; thus, it raises the possibility that a
discrimination suit will not trigger coverage under the employer's CGL
or WC/EL policies.'72 On the other hand, an employer can utilize the
contra proferentem maxim and the reasonable expectations doctrine to
Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Wis. 1992) (finding that allegations of
indirect discrimination due to the discriminatory practices of other agencies is an occurrence);
Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987)
(exclusion of intentional acts and discrimination is ineffective as to an employee's allegations of
corporate negligence in hiring and supervising the offending employee); Bensalem Township v.
Western World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (ruling willful violation of
ADEA can be an occurrence because "willful" does not refer necessarily to intentional behavior in
this statutory context).
170. See Educational Testing Serv. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 96-2790-VRW, 1997 WL
220315, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
271 Cal. Rptr 2d. 528, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
171. Duff Supply Co., 1997 WL 255483, at *13 (applying a "but for" causation test and
refusing coverage of an employment discrimination claim). See Educational Testing Serv., 1997
WL 220315, at *6; Schmidt v. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 72 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996); Mattox Enterprises,
Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., No. 95-629, 1995 WL 541471, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
1995); Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distrib., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 376, 379
(D.S.C. 1993); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assocs., Inc., 2 F.3d 105,
109 (5th Cir. 1993); McLeod v. Tecorp Int'l, Ltd., 865 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Or. 1993) (excluding
coverage for alleged wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Conrad
v. Mike Anderson Seafood, Inc., No. 89-1481, 1991 WL 22925, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1991);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Skapyak, No. 89-524, 1989 WL 84180, at *2 (Minn. App. Aug.
1, 1989); Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986).
172. See Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Iowa
1993); Omark Indus. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 114, 121 (D. Or. 1984). This reading of the
CGL policy makes sense, given that there is often a separate exclusion for liabilities incurred
pursuant to the state's Worker's Compensation laws. See Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co.,
559 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Minn. 1997); Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 477
S.E.2d 59, 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("We find persuasive that exclusion (I) specifically references
liability for injuries covered under workers' compensation, while exclusion (j) does not.").
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limit the scope of the exclusion to the coverage otherwise provided by
WC/EL policies if the CGL form was marketed in this manner.173 In
any event, the employer may insist that its insurer provide a defense of
an employment related claim until such time as the insurer can demon-
strate that all of the alleged wrongdoing falls within the exclusion. 174
With respect to coverage, however, the employer must demonstrate that
the suit seeks damages against an insured that is not the employing
entity, or that the wrongdoers were acting outside the course of their
employment when they caused injury to the plaintiff, in order to avoid
this exclusion. 7 '
The insuring agreement of Coverage B provides coverage for dam-
ages resulting from a "personal injury" or "advertising injury," without
limiting coverage to accidental occurrences. The policy definition of
"personal injury" makes clear that Coverage B provides coverage for
non-bodily injuries arising out of one or more of the listed torts, includ-
ing invasion of privacy by publication, libel, and slander. Given the
many obstacles to asserting coverage under Coverage A, and the
increasing frequency of defamation claims being added to employment
discrimination claims, many employers rely upon Coverage B to
demand a defense of the suit.
The primary advantage of pursuing coverage under Coverage B is
that it is triggered by certain intentional "offenses" rather than by
"occurrences," eliminating the requirement that the injuries in question
be the result of an accident.' 76 Many older umbrella policy forms
173. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 604
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
174. Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Shoney's, 923 F. Supp. 1481 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Terra Nova Ins.
Co. v. Chillum Corp., 526 A.2d 642 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 532 A.2d 168 (Md. 1987).
175. See, e.g., Maine State Academy of Hair Design, 699 A.2d at 1158 (reversing summary
judgment for insurer because the plaintiff did not allege that the acts of discrimination arose out of
and occurred within the course of her employment); Bond Builders, Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Me. 1996) (finding that the duty to defend is triggered and not
excluded, because there is a possibility that the assault by the plaintiffs fellow workers was not in
the course of their employment); Schmidt, 684 A.2d at 75-76 (exclusion does not cover post-
hiring, pre-employment harassment and assault at the company Christmas party); Western
Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. & Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 90 (5th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that exclusion only applies to corporate employer, but husband and wife "owners" who
sued in their individual capacities for harassment are entitled to coverage as named insureds on the
policy). In Western Heritage, note, however, that the exclusion in the current CGL form provides
that the exclusion applies whether "the insured may be liable as an employer or in any other
capacity." Id. at 90.
176. This distinction between Coverage A and Coverage B sometimes is misunderstood,
leading to a great deal of confusion. In Missouri Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty
Association v. Petrolite Corp., 918 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996), the insurance carier refused
to defend or indemnify the employer once a determination was made that the employer's actions
constituted a "willful" violation of the ADEA because there could be not occurrence, but the court
properly noted that coverage was sought under Coverage B for Personal Injuries caused by
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expanded the coverage for personal injuries by specifically adding "dis-
crimination" to the list of covered torts, thereby providing an obvious
trigger of coverage. 177 However, newer policies are either unlikely to
contain this express coverage of discrimination, or will include the cov-
erage only with explicit limitations. 171 Consequently, the duty to defend
is often triggered by allegations of defamation made in connection with
the underlying discrimination allegations. 179
Given the broad duty to defend any action that could potentially
intentional torts. Id. at 873. The court noted the absurdity of the insurer's interpretation:
"Reading the 'personal injury' definition and the 'occurrence' definition together, the policy
apparently provides coverage for 'unintentional intentional torts' not committed by or at the
direction of the insured . . . the result of such language is 'complete nonsense."' Id. The easy
answer to this apparent dilemma is that Coverage B does not require an occurrence, but instead
provides coverage for personal injuries caused by an "offense." But see Edquist v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., No. C6-95-1111, 1995 WL 635179, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1995) (ruling that
a business auto portion of the insured's liability package collapsed bodily injury and personal
injury into one designation (personal injury) that was covered only if caused by an "occurrence"
and arising out of the use of the auto, rendering intentional torts committed by a supervisor against
a female employee while in the company car uninsurable).
177. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980); Clark-
Peterson Co., Inc. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1992) (en banc).
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744 (11 th Cir.
1991), the court denied an attempt by an umbrella carrier to obtain contributions from the
employer's CGL carriers because the CGL carriers had more carefully drafted their policies to
exclude discrimination from coverage. Id. at 749-50. Cf American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-
Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (personal injury
defined to include "racial or religious discrimination" must be read according to its plain meaning
as not including all Title VII liabilities).
178. See Duff Supply Co., 1997 WL 255483, at *10-12 (coverage for discrimination later
limited by exclusion of personal injury arising on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age, national
origin, or termination of employment held not to encompass allegations of sexual discrimination);
Kline v. The Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994);
Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(describing the carrier's change in umbrella policy forms between 1972 and 1973 to stop
including discrimination in the definition of personal injury). One limitation is to include
coverage only for discrimination not committed by the insured or at its discretion, in an attempt to
provide coverage only for liabilities incurred by an employer on account of the acts of its agents.
See Town of South Whitley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 724 F. Supp. 599, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1989)
(exclusion of discrimination "committed by you" in an umbrella policy is enforced because the
alleged discriminatory refusal to hire was an action by the insured Town Board of Trustees, rather
than by an agent of the Town), affd, 921 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990). Another limitation provides
coverage for discrimination liabilities generally, but excludes liabilities for employment
discrimination. See Teague Motor Co., Inc. v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 1130, 1132-33
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that limited coverage for non-employment discrimination in
umbrella policy is neither ambiguous nor illusory, even though all sexual harassment claims
would necessarily be excluded).
179. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southern Publ'g Co., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1990) (allegation
of defamation against employer president regarding his remarks about the reasons why the
plaintiffs were terminated falls within the coverage of slander); Maine State Academy of Hair
Design, 699 A.2d at 1159 (allegations of damage to professional reputation create at least the
potential for coverage under Part B of the policy).
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result in a covered verdict, some courts will construe sexual harassment
complaints alleging sexist comments about the plaintiffs as triggering
this duty, even if no cause of action for defamation has been pleaded
formally in the complaint. 80  Coverage in these circumstances is not
assured, however, since many courts will not read into the complaint
defamation allegations that are not raised explicitly, nor will they con-
strue discriminatory behavior as defamatory in itself."' 1 Additionally,
plaintiff employees often include allegations of false imprisonment in
their sexual harassment complaints, another enumerated intentional tort
under the definition of "personal injury" in Coverage B. However, not
every unwelcome physical encounter amounts to a false imprisonment,
and so the facts, as pleaded in the complaint, will trigger coverage only
if they constitute the tort of false imprisonment.1 82 The exclusions in
Coverage B are less pertinent to employment litigation, generally, but
the exclusion of personal injury "arising out of the willful violation of a
penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of the
insured" designates an uninsurable risk that may be relevant to some
180. See, e.g., Duff Supply Co., 1997 WL 255483, at *6-8 (finding that allegations that the
plaintiffs were generally referred to as "slurs" and "whores" raised the potential for a recovery for
defamation, even though not separately pleaded); American Guar. & Liab. Ins. v. Vista Med.
Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787, 793 (N.D. Cal. 1988); United States Fire, 511 N.E.2d at 751 (finding
that allegations of harassment and discrimination by means of false and defamatory (sexist)
comments about the plaintiff falls within the coverage of slander).
181. See Farr's Stationers, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 96-55179, 1997 WL 267786
(9th Cir. May 20, 1997). The court stated that:
Under California law, however, where, as here, the complaint does not expressly
contain a cause of action for defamation, a duty to defend can be triggered only
where the extrinsic facts clearly put the insurer on notice that there is potential for
defamation liability. There is no indication in this case that, by asserting in her
supplementary declaration that she had been called a 'bitch' in front of other sales
representative, the plaintiff was seeking damages on account of injury to her
reputation as a result of a false statement of fact.
Id. at *2; Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 477 S.E. 2d 59, 68-70 (N.C. App.
1996); Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (no potential
coverage found because the plaintiff did not plead independent allegations of defamation or false
imprisonment, and factual descriptions of acts of sexual harassment, such as being backed into a
comer and fondled, are insufficient to trigger these coverages since "the allegations in question do
no more than reflect the reality that such harassment can take place behind closed doors or in the
presence of coworkers"); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that personal injury, defined to include "humilia-
tion," is not triggered by discrimination complaint, since any humiliation experienced by the
employee was a result of sex discrimination, a non-covered risk).
A complaint alleging sexual harassment does not automatically trigger personal injury cover-
age for libel and slander. See Lindsey v. Admiral Ins. Co., 804 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
Omark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 114, 120 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
182. See, e.g., Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 85 (5th Cir. 1997) (allegation
that supervisor attempted to force himself on plaintiff employee in a supply room doesn't trigger
coverage because there was no allegation that the door was locked or that the supervisor detained
her in the room for any period of time by use of physical force or threats).
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discrimination claims.
1 8 3
During the past ten years, a number of employers have been able to
trigger the duty to defend when Coverage A has been ambiguously
drafted, when Coverage B expressly includes discrimination, or when
the underlying complaint raises other torts defined as personal injury. In
response to this rapidly expanding source of liability, the ISO prepared
an "Employment-Related Practices Exclusion" endorsement designed to
amend both Coverage A and Coverage B by removing employment dis-
crimination litigation from the scope of basic coverage provided by the
CGL policy. 184 Generally, insurers have been successful in enforcing
this type of exclusion, and so it should be expected that liability policies
will include such clauses with increasing frequency.' 85 However, even
the comprehensive employment-related practices exclusion will be sub-
ject to judicial interpretation and will not prove to be an absolute bar to
183. It seems unlikely that this exclusion would apply to any violation of a statutory scheme.
See, e.g., Bensalem Township v. Western World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (finding a willful violation of the ADEA does not bring the matter within the exclusion
because "willful" is defined differently in the two usages). This exclusion is likely intended to
exclude civil liabilities arising out of illegal actions. See MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855
P.2d 77, 80 (Kan. 1993) (enforcing exclusion by denying coverage to an employer that subjected
its employees to wiretaps that were illegal under the federal criminal code).
184. See Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Liability and
Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 18 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 47, 69-70 (1996). The new
provision excludes coverage of bodily injury or personal injury arising out of any refusal to
employ that person, termination of that person's employment, or "employment-related practices,
acts or omissions, such as coercion, demotion, evaluation,. reassignment, discipline, defamation,
harassment, humiliation or discrimination directed at that person." Id.
185. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 93-3417,
1994 WL 540663, at *6 n.4 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1994) (unpublished disposition); Old Republic Ins.
Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993) (enforcing a "sexual
abuse" exclusion and an "employment-related claim" exclusion in a CGL policy, and enforcing an
"employment" exclusion in an umbrella policy); Reliable Springs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1989) (enforcing "discrimination and unfair employment
practices" exclusion); Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Peppers, 890 F. Supp. 634, 644-45 (D. Tex.
1995) (enforcing "employment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions" exclusion with
regard to defamation claim by one partner against another); P&C Bakeries v. Northbrook Nat'l
Ins. Co., No. C-92-2555VRW, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19355, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1992);
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut., 667 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265 (1994) (exclusions in Worker's
Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy); Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co.,
869 P.2d 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (exclusion of employment discrimination from umbrella
policy); Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm, 495 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa 1993) (exclusion
barring coverage for claims arising out of conduct at the workplace upheld); Loyola Marymount
Univ. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 528, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing
exclusion of personal injuries "as a result of an offense directly or indirectly related to the
employment or prospective employment" of the claimant); Alexandra House, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 419 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (no duty to defend defamation
count because the alleged personal injury was "related to his or her employment").
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coverage for all forms of employment discrimination liability.' 86
Lawsen v. Strauss187 provides a good example of the "holes" that
may remain in the exclusion. In Lawson, the Louisiana Court of Appeal
held that the new ISO exclusion did not defeat coverage when women
employees sued several doctors and their Eye Center employer for
assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, since
the doctors were not carrying out their employment duties.188 The court
reasoned that the "mere fact that an employee is involved does not mean
that a 'personnel practice,' etc. is at issue or the exclusion would have
been written to simply state that no claims by employees are cov-
ered."' 89 However, other courts have challenged this pro-insured read-
ing of the exclusion. In Frank and Freedus v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'9 °
the California Court of Appeal adopted a more traditional "plain mean-
ing" approach to applying the clause.
Nor is the term "employment-related" ambiguous because it is
not specifically defined in the policy. The term is not technical in
nature. It is used in its ordinary sense, i.e., related to employment.
As a term, it modifies the specified acts (including defamation) as
well as the terms "practices, policies, acts or omissions." The clear
meaning of subdivision (2) of the exclusion is coverage for practices,
policies, acts or omissions which are related to employment, includ-
ing employment-related defamation.' 9 '
Definitive interpretations of this exclusion are unlikely in the near
future.
If an employment practices exclusion is more narrow than the ISO
language, it obviously is more susceptible to interpretations that benefit
the insured. For example, in Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management
Agency v. Town of West Hartford,9 2 a trial court held that an exclusion
of claims "arising out of your official employment policies or practices
186. See Lawson v. Strauss, 673 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1996). Cf Schmidt, supra notes
155-57 (discussing similar exclusion in WC/EL forms).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 227.
189. Id. See also HS Services, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 1997).
The court held that "for an act or omission to be 'employment-related' the relationship must be
direct and proximate." Id. at 647. The court further found that an allegation by a terminated
employee, now competing with the insured, that the insured defamed him three months after the
termination of employment, is potentially within coverage because "the statements were not made
in the context of [his] employment." Id.
190. 52 Cal. Rptr 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
191. Id. at 684. See also International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 1357 v. American
Int'l. Adjustment Co. Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1218, 1222-23 (D. Haw. 1997) (court repeatedly
summarized the scope of the exclusion as applicable to any claims arising from the "employment
relationship" in the course of entering summary judgment for the carriers).
192. No. 534047, 1996 WL 219595 (Conn. Spec. Ct. Apr. 10, 1996).
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(including but not limited to claims due to demotion, selection, dismis-
sal, failure to promote, and similar activity)" did not absolve the insurer
of the duty to defend a complaint that alleged defamatory comments
about an employee that in part were unconnected with any personnel
action. 193 The court noted that the exclusion language "contrasted
sharply" with the ISO language.1 94 Moreover, the court opined that
even defamatory comments in connection with an investigation of the
employee's alleged sexual harassment would trigger the duty to defend,
because a claim resulting from such an investigation "is not similar to a
claim arising from a change in employment status. ' 95
Additional problems arise if the insurer simply adds an employ-
ment practices exclusion to an existing policy without carefully integrat-
ing it to the other provisions. For example, where an insurer specifically
provided coverage for "discrimination," but later in the policy excluded
liabilities for personal injuries "directly or indirectly related to the dis-
missal of any employee of the Insured," a California court found that the
apparent effort to disclaim all liabilities related to employment practices
was unsuccessful:
The claims of Smith in the underlying action have no relation at all to
a dismissal from employment; she alleged, in fact, that she resigned
after being harassed.... The mere act of unintentionally discriminat-
ing against someone in violation of the law cannot be an "offense"
negating the very coverage granted to the insured for claims of "dis-
crimination" by the policy itself. This interpretation by Zurich of its
policy would result in an entirely fictional grant of coverage .... If
Zurich desires to market and sell a policy which provides coverage
for claims of discrimination, but excludes all claims of discrimination
by employees of any insured, it must say so in clear, unambiguous
policy language .... 196
This rationale is particularly persuasive with regard to "discrimination"
coverage, but may not be adopted by courts assessing whether the duty
to defend is triggered by allegations of another enumerated tort in Cov-
erage B. 197
Because a multi-count complaint that contains even a single claim
potentially within coverage will trigger the duty to defend, it is likely
that many discrimination cases will pose difficult interpretive problems.
For example, after an employee resigns or is terminated, the employer
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id. at *4.
195. Id.
196. Melugin v. Zurich Canada, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
197. See, e.g., Frank & Freedus, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684 (there is no ambiguity in providing
coverage for defamation and then later excluding coverage for defamation related to employment).
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may make allegedly defamatory comments regarding the employee. A
post-employment defamation claim appended to a general discrimina-
tion complaint might be construed not to be defamation that amounts to
an "employment-related practice," thus taking the claim outside the
scope of the exclusion.198
C. Directors & Officers
Discrimination actions rarely give rise to claims against the officers
and directors of a large corporation since they often have little day-to-
day oversight of employment matters. Recent revelations, however,
about the behavior of Texaco executives in connection with the defense
of racial discrimination litigation provide a plausible scenario in which
lawsuits might be targeted against individual corporate officers. 199 In
contrast, directors and officers of smaller corporations may well be sued
personally for harm allegedly resulting from their official actions.
Directors and Officers ("D&O") policies do not provide coverage to the
employer for its liabilities; therefore, a discrimination complaint that
names only the employer and lower level employees usually will not
trigger coverage under a D&O policy. 2" Additionally, the policies do
not cover directors and officers for wrongful acts committed by them
outside of their official capacities, although it is important to distinguish
between a director or officer acting within her capacity as such and a
198. See Machson & Monteleone, supra note 10, at 708 ("For example, coverage could depend
on whether the employer said 'you're a stupid and incompetent jerk and you're fired' (arguably
not covered because the insult occurred during employment), or 'you're fired, you stupid and
incompetent jerk' (possibly covered because the insult occurred post-employment)."). Some
courts have construed the exclusion so as to include such claims within its scope. See Frank &
Freedus, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 684. Cf. HS Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 642 (9th
Cir. 1997).
Similarly, intentional torts committed after the underlying discriminatory behavior is
completed may provide an independent basis for coverage. See Great Am. Ins. v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (involving coverage for alleged threat to reveal
private, embarrassing facts about the plaintiff in order to induce settlement of an on-going age
discrimination claim despite a broadly stated exclusion for employment discrimination).
199. See Firm's Officials Also Talked of Destroying Documents Sought in Suit, Transcripts
Show; Tapes Capture Racist Talk By Texaco Execs., CHI. TRUB., Nov. 4, 1996, available in 1996
WL 2723585.
200. For example, in Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 991
F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1993), a private club, sued for racial and gender discrimination by the City,
sought a defense from its D&O carrier on the theory that any discriminatory practices resulted
from actions of the directors. The court rejected this approach, finding that no directors or officers
had been named in the lawsuits and that the discriminatory practices could have been carried out
by the members of the club. After emphasizing the nature of D&O insurance, the court concluded
that coverage would be triggered only if the employer showed "that the City alleges that a
director, officer or employee [per a coverage endorsement] specifically authorized, directed or
participated in the Club's discriminatory acts and thereby breached a duty owed to the City and
the public at large." Id. at 502.
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director or officer acting with full agency authority.20  For example, it is
implausible that an officer of a corporation is acting within the scope of
his delegated powers when he sexually harasses a female employee, but
if he commits the harassment when he ostensibly is carrying out his
duties as an officer of the corporation, there would be a strong argument
for triggering the D&O policy. In contrast, a corporate officer who
assaults a female employee off-premises may not be acting in his capac-
ity as an officer.
Even if the litigation is arguably within the insuring agreement of
the D&O policy, a number of employment discrimination claims might
be excluded from coverage under the so-called "insured v. insured"
exclusion clause. Typically, D&O policies do not provide coverage for
officers and directors of a corporation when they are sued by a fellow
officer or director. 202 This exclusion has a far-reaching scope if the pol-
icy is strictly interpreted by the court since many D&O policies will
define "directors and officers" as "employees" of the corporation for
purposes of at least some of the coverage.20 3 However, when the dis-
crimination plaintiff brings suit after being terminated or constructively
discharged, courts interpreting a "claims made" policy may find that the
exclusion is inapplicable, since the plaintiff is no longer an insured
employee at the time of the "claim." 2"
Contrary to the trend in CGL policies to exclude any liability for
employment discrimination claims, many carriers that write D&O cover-
age have added an endorsement to provide "Employment Practices Lia-
bility" coverage at no charge to their customers. This marketing gamble
may pay off, since D&O policies do not include a duty to defend and the
final disposition of virtually all employment discrimination suits will not
result in individual liability for corporate officers and directors. Given
this express adoption of coverage, however, employment lawyers are
well counseled to examine potential coverage under their clients' D&O
policies.
201. See Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Servs. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 971 F.2d
1, 4 (6th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a director may be acting in the capacity of a director for purposes
of a wrongful termination suit, even though the director's actions were beyond the scope of
agency authority).
202. Compare Foster v. Kentucky Housing Corp., 850 F. Supp. 558, 561 (E.D. Ky. 1994)
(coverage excluded) with Conklin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 4-86-860, 1987 WL
108957, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 1987) (exclusion inapplicable).
203. See, e.g., Foster, 850 F. Supp. at 559.
204. Cf. Township of Center, Butler County, Pennsylvania v. First Mercury Syndicate, Inc.,
117 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) (interpreting exclusion in E&O policy, in light of the purpose of
preventing collusive litigation, as not applying to a wrongful discharge suit brought by a former
employee).
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D. Errors & Omissions
The insurance industry has developed a form of Errors & Omis-
sions ("E&O") policy, often known as a "Board of Education Liability
Policy," to provide insurance to schools. Educational institutions face a
wide variety of potential claims of discrimination, including suits by stu-
dents under Title IX and by employees under Title VII. Because these
policies are designed to protect the school from the wrongful and some-
times intentional acts of its agents, there is often a strong argument that
employment discrimination claims are within coverage. 0 5 If the policy
restricts the definition of "wrongful acts" to negligence, however, then
only disparate impact discrimination will be within coverage. 20 6 Simi-
larly, if the policy offsets a broad grant of coverage with plainly worded
exclusions of intentional discriminatory acts, no coverage will exist for
allegations of sexual discrimination that amount to claims of an inten-
tional sexual assault.2 0 7
Because these policies often appear to provide coverage even for
intentional discrimination, insurers have sought to have such coverage
declared void as against public policy.2 8 This argument increasingly
meets with skepticism, however, since the insurer appears to be seeking
a back door out of promised coverage for which premiums have been
paid. An Illinois appellate court noted that:
The fact that many insurance policies contain an exclusion for inten-
tional conduct demonstrates insurers have not relied on any broad
public policy. Defendant could have included such an exclusion in
its [Board of Education Liability] policy, but did not. This court will
not rewrite the BEL policy to create an exclusion.20 9
E&O policies explicitly exclude coverage for bodily injuries, which are
covered by the CGL or WC/EL products, and therefore, cases of sexual
harassment that include physical abuse might be deemed to fall outside
205. See Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 900 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding Title IX liability for sexual discrimination against student is within policy
coverage), rev'd on other grounds, 99 F.3d 695, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Title IX
claims were within coverage, even though alleging intentional acts, but that an exclusion of
liability arising from criminal acts applied to the alleged sexual assault); Andover Newton
Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas., 930 F.2d 89, 92 n.3, 93 (1st Cir. 1991) (ruling that
ADEA intentional discrimination is within "wrongful acts" coverage); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 378 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing coverage for Title IX
and Title VII claims); Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 419 N.E.2d
1257, 1260 (I11. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing coverage to include race and sex discrimination claims).
206. See School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah County v. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929, 935-36
(Or. Ct. App. 1982).
207. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Peters, 21 Colo. 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
208. See supra Part III.
209. University of Illinois v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (I11. Ct. App. 1992).
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the scope of the typical E&O policy.2"'
E. Employment-Related Practices Liability Insurance
As general liability insurers and worker's compensation insurers
moved aggressively to exclude discrimination and other employment lia-
bilities from coverage, surplus lines insurers began developing forms to
provide coverage to employers for employment-related practices liabili-
ties. More recently, even larger standard market insurers have entered
this market. Some of these emerging products are narrowly tailored,
providing only reimbursement of legal expenses incurred in defending
employment-related litigation, or providing coverage only for certain
liabilities, such as discrimination or wrongful termination. However,
insurers have created a large market in the past few years for policies
that provide broad coverage for employment-related liabilities. This
market includes both primary policies and endorsements to umbrella
policies.
Awareness of EPLI products has grown tremendously in the past
several years as the number of insurers offering this product has multi-
plied. This awareness was evidenced in dramatic fashion in a recent
case involving a discrimination suit brought by a fired chief financial
officer. The court recounts that the plaintiff was disturbed by the
employer's inattention to her complaints: "concerned by their cavalier
attitude, she advised them to 'sober up,' call counsel to determine a cor-
porate response, and find out whether they had employment practices
liability insurance."2 1 Aggressive marketing by insurers promises to
make EPLI a familiar insurance product that might even become part of
the standard business liability insurance program if current trends
continue. 2
Although a variety of manuscripted forms exist, common features
of these policies reflect the experience of general liability insurers faced
with claims for coverage of employment liabilities during the past
twenty years. First, most policies continue to include a right and duty to
defend, but contain these expenditures within the policy limits. This not
only acknowledges that litigation expenses may be of greatest concern to
the employers and that the ability to control the defense and settlement
210. See Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1212
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
211. Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Serv., Inc. 1997 WL 528310, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 1997).
212. See Sally Roberts, Spotlight Report: A Closer Look at Specialty Risks: Environmental &
Professional Liability: Maturing EPL Market Offering Enhanced Cover, Bus. INs. (June 9,
1997), reprinted in 1997 WL 8294830 (describing the increase in the number of carriers offering
EPLI, the expansion of coverage, the reduction of premiums, and the continued aggressive
marketing during 1997).
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of claims may be particularly important to insurers in this area, but also
that the expected payouts under the policies must be rendered more cer-
tain and stable for the insurer to accept the risk. It is equally important
that the policies are underwritten on a claims-made basis, rather than on
an occurrence basis. This provides two important benefits to the carrier:
it minimizes the insurer's responsibility for risks that existed prior to the
underwriting and implementation of its loss prevention programs, and it
allows the insurer to quickly adjust in the face of an unexpected negative
loss history by eliminating the long tail of coverage that exists Under
occurrence-based policies. Moreover, many policies require the insurer
not only to pay a deductible, but also to participate in the risk by bearing
a percentage of the loss. This reflects the belief that an aggressively
proactive employer can be motivated by financial considerations to min-
imize the expected loss.
Because EPLI coverage is so new to the market, no reported cases
exist which signal the likely coverage disputes. However, it is possible
to anticipate some areas of potential conflict in light of the history of
disputes under other primary coverages. At this time, it appears that
EPLI policies will be written exclusively on a claims-made basis, as
insurers attempt to reduce the uncertainties that the long "tail" of liabili-
ties under occurrence-based policies pose. To preclude adverse selec-
tion-the problem that only employers who know of occurrences that
might ripen into claims in the near future will seek to purchase EPLI
insurance-insurers are utilizing lengthy and detailed applications to
elicit information about the employer's personnel practices and knowl-
edge of any potential claims. With the filing of a claim, insurers will
scrutinize these applications for evidence of misrepresentations, presum-
ably leading to coverage litigation in some cases. 2 13
Since EPLI policies, generally, are written broadly enough to
encompass such risks if permitted by law, another major issue will be
coverage for disparate treatment discrimination in light of the public pol-
icy of the state in which the question of coverage arises. Additionally,
because the policies often grant coverage in a manner keyed to terms of
art in discrimination law, such as "sexual harassment" and "retaliatory
termination," employers may argue that these terms are ambiguous, and
therefore, to be broadly construed for insurance purposes in light of the
continuing evolution of employment discrimination law.
213. For example, in a dispute involving a claims-made D&O policy, one court found that the
insured had made material, albeit honest, misrepresentations on the application regarding
knowledge of any facts or circumstances that indicated a probability of a claim within the policy
coverage being filed. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 93-3417,
1994 WL 540663, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1994).
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Finally, EPLI policies contain a number of exclusions that will
raise coverage questions, such as the exclusion for "willful failure to
comply with the law." In the absence of precise definitions, there may
be litigation concerning the scope of the exclusions when a plaintiff
alleges a "willful" violation of the ADEA, because "willful" and "inten-
tional" may have different meanings for employment discrimination pur-
poses as opposed to insurance coverage purposes. Finally, there may be
significant disputes between insurers writing EPLI policies and those
writing CGL policies in light of the EPLI exclusion of bodily injuries. It
may often be unclear on the basis of a typical vague complaint whether
alleged physical injuries flowing from discriminatory treatment trigger
CGL coverage or remain within the EPLI scope of coverage.
F. Timing Issues: "Occurrence-" and "Claims-Made"
Under occurrence-based insurance, the policy coverage is triggered
when the bodily injury or personal injury caused by the occurrence takes
place, regardless of when the occurrence itself happens. Consequently,
if corporate officials began to follow a promotion policy in 1990 that has
the effect of unfairly limiting the opportunities for women and minori-
ties to advance in the business, coverage under an insurance policy for
this "occurrence" will be triggered each time an employee suffers injury
as a result of this single occurrence.2"4 Regardless of the number and
timing of the covered injuries caused by the adoption of the discrimina-
tory policy, and therefore the number of policies that might be triggered,
there is only one occurrence that is the cause of the losses. Because the
deductible is owed per occurrence, rather than per injury, when a
number of discrimination claims emanate from "continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions," the
employer will only be required to pay one deductible.2" 5 However, the
insured will not be indemnified beyond the limit of coverage, which also
is specified "per occurrence" for the policy year.2 16 These features of
occurrence coverage generally works to the advantage of the employer,
since a number of relatively small claims arising from the same cause
may not exceed the policy limit even when combined, but each claim
214. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62-63, aff'd, 676 F.2d 56
(3d Cir. 1982); Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (N.D.
Tex. 1980); Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986).
215. See Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
216. See id.
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may be less than the applicable deductible.2" 7
In contrast, a "claims-made" policy triggers coverage when a claim
is made, rather than when the occurrence takes place or the resulting
injuries are suffered. In the context of employment discrimination, there
is a great deal of uncertainty about when a "claim" is made for purposes
of insurance coverage. Many policies do not define the term, and the
requirement that plaintiffs pursue administrative remedies before the
EEOC or various state agencies before filing suit renders the notion of a
"claim" of employment discrimination ambiguous at best. Given this
uncertainty, some courts expressly hold that the requirement of a
"claim" must be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the employer.2' 8 The division in the cases is somewhat decep-
tive, since the insured employer may argue in favor of an EEOC charge
being considered a claim in some circumstances, but in different circum-
stances another employer may wish to argue that the claim is made only
when the lawsuit is filed.219 What seems clear is that many courts will
interpret the ambiguous terms against the insurer if it is reasonable to do
so. The doctrinal split revolves around the notion that a "claim" is a
demand for relief; therefore, a claim is not made until the employee
seeks damages. Because the EEOC is empowered to conciliate employ-
ment disputes rather than to award damages, many courts do not regard
an EEOC charge as a claim.220 However, proceedings before a state
217. See Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61 (finding that single occurrences work in favor of
the insured since all individual claims were less than $25,000 deductible).
218. See Pinckney Community Sch. v. Continental Cas. Co., 540 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995).
219. For example, in Pinckney, when the policy required that the claim be made within two
years of policy termination to come within coverage, and the federal lawsuit was not filed until
seven years later, the employer argued that the EEOC charge constituted a claim. Pinckney, 540
N.w.2d at 750. The court held in the insured's favor, noting that the employer and insurer both
reacted to the EEOC filing as if it were a claim that triggered coverage, and also the practical
reality that an EEOC charge is the first step in making a claim for relief. Id. at 753-54. On the
other hand, in National Union, when an insured sought coverage under a claims-made E&O
policy with an inception date two days after the EEOC charge had been filed, the court reasoned
that a "claim" connoted a demand for money damages which cannot be made until the filing of a
federal lawsuit. National Union Fire Ins. v. Cary Community Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 26, No.
93C6526, 1995 WL 66303, at *3-4 (N.D. IIl. Feb. 15, 1995).
Nevertheless, in a recent decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeal interpreted the term
"claim" broadly in a manner that defeated the insured's basis for seeking coverage, over a strong
dissent. See City of Mankato v. League of Minnesota Cities Ins. Trust, No. C8-93-1090, 1993
WL 527886, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1993) (holding that the claim occurred at the latest
when the matter was referred to the attorney general, although the federal lawsuit was not filed
until a year later when the policy was in force).
220. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d 969, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990); Bensalem Township, 609 F. Supp. at 1348; cf Maine State Academy of Hair Design,
699 A.2d at 1160 (state administrative agency not empowered to award damages, and so
administrative filing is not a "claim" under the policy).
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agency with coercive power to award damages and adjudicate the plain-
tiffs allegations will generally be regarded as a claim.22 .
VI. CLAIM PROCESSING AND Loss ADJUSTMENT
Successfully arguing that a liability policy is triggered by a claim of
employment discrimination does not end the analysis for the employer.
Liability policies impose duties on both parties that are vitally important
to the risk management function served by the policies. This section
analyzes the obligations assumed by the employer and insurer, and the
significance of these duties for the employer's efforts to enforce cover-
age of the underlying discrimination claim.
A. Insured's Duties: Notice, Cooperation and the Misrepresentation
Defense
Liability policies generally place conditions on the insurer's obliga-
tions to indemnify the insured and to provide a defense. The purpose of
these conditions is to establish a claim settlement process which will
ensure effective protection under the policy for the employer, while also
affording the insurer the information it needs to settle the employer's
claim properly. The employer's principal duties under the policy are to
provide timely notice of the potentially covered occurrence and to coop-
erate with the insurer's investigation and defense of the action. The
notification requirement in the ISO CGL form is typical. It requires the
employer to notify the insurer "as soon as practicable of an occurrence
or an offense which may result in a claim" by providing the known
details of the occurrence. Additionally, the employer must notify the
insurer as soon as practicable of any claim or suit to which the policy
applies by immediately sending "copies of any demands, notices, sum-
monses or legal papers." This latter duty is particularly important since
the insurer is not only under the obligation to defend the insured in the
suit, but also has the right to "investigate any occurrence and settle any
claim or suit that may result" in its discretion.
The employer's failure to comply with its obligations under the
policy will certainly impair the claim settlement process and may estab-
lish a defense to enforcement of the policy in favor of the insurer. Gen-
erally, courts are hesitant to deprive the third party claimant of a source
of funds to satisfy a judgment solely on the basis of the insured's failure
to comply with the notice provisions of the policy. In many jurisdic-
tions, therefore, the insurer is excused from its indemnity obligations
221. See Wayne E. Borgeest, et al., Employment Law Claims: Triggering Coverage Under
"Claims Made" Policies, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. Rav. 179, 184-86 (1996).
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under the policy only if the delay in notice has prejudiced its efforts to
investigate and defend the claim.22 In one case, a court held that the
insurer was bound to its policy obligations despite the employer's failure
to notify it of the occurrence until two years after a discrimination class
action had been filed, due to the insurer's failure to prove actual preju-
dice resulting from the delay. 223 However, the judicial tendency to
enforce coverage despite less than responsible behavior by the insured
does have limits. When the employer's delay in providing notice obvi-
ously has prejudiced the insurer's rights because the litigation has sub-
stantially progressed, the courts have not hesitated to relieve the insurer
of its duty to pay judgments or settlements on behalf of the employer.224
This requirement of prejudice is not applied to the notice requirements
under claims-made policies, where the "reporting" requirement is treated
as a condition precedent to coverage.2 '
Prejudice occurs not only when the insurer's ability to conduct the
litigation has been thwarted, but also when its right to investigate the
occurrence has been hampered. Consequently, even when the carrier
owes no duty to defend, it can successfully argue that it is absolved of its
222. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 10, § 7.2(e) (describing the balancing test employed by
many courts to determine whether a failure to provide notice prejudices the insured sufficiently to
warrant denying a source of funds to the third party claimant by excusing the insurer of its duty to
pay damages on behalf of the insured); JERRY, supra note 140, at 530 ("The majority view, which
places the burden on the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the lack of timely notice, rejects
the presumption of prejudice and refuses to cause a forfeiture of coverage unless the insurer can
demonstrate why this is fair.").
223. See Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986).
224. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King County, 749 F. Supp. 230, 234 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (insurer was prejudiced when the employer failed to notify the insurer of the suit until three
years after it was filed, four months after the plaintiffs verdict at trial, and only one day prior to a
court-arranged conference to settle the appeal; the employer's claim that it honestly believed that
the self-insured retention of $300,000 would not be exceeded in the case was unreasonable), aft'd,
942 F.2d 794 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Occidental Int'l, 967 F. Supp. 642, 647 (D.P.R. 1997)
(failure to notify carrier of harassment and discrimination claim until nearly two months after the
jury verdict constitutes prejudice as a matter of law); Kerr v. Illinois Central R.R., 670 N.E.2d
759, 766-67 (I11. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that insurer was prejudiced when the employer failed to
notify the insurer of the suit until six years after it was filed, after liability had been upheld on
appeal, and settlement negotiations regarding damages to be paid were underway; the employer's
claim that it honestly believed that the $1.5 million self-insured retention would not be exceeded
in the case was held unreasonable); Dan River, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 317 S.E.2d
485, 487 (Va. 1984) (finding insurer was prejudiced when the employer failed to notify the insurer
of the suit until eight years after EEOC filings and a federal lawsuit, three years after a trial before
a Special Master, one and one half years after the Special Master reported that the plaintiffs had
substantially prevailed, and four months after the Special Master's report unfavorable to the
employer was filed; the employer's claim that it honestly believed it would avoid covered liability
until the Special Master's report was filed did not meet the requirement of "objectively
reasonable" notice).
225. See Borgeest, supra note 221, at 186-89.
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coverage obligations under the policy when the employer has failed to
give appropriate notice.226 Finally, several courts have acknowledged
that late notice might preclude reimbursement of defense costs even if it
is not sufficiently prejudicial to void the coverage, on the theory that the
insurer should not have to pay for a defense that it had the right to con-
duct.z2 7 In light of all these considerations, it is vital that the employ-
ment lawyer assist the employer in identifying any and all liability
policies that potentially provide coverage for an occurrence or claim as
soon as possible. This will enable the employer to provide prompt
notice to the pertinent carriers in order to facilitate claim processing, and
to preserve its right to secure full reimbursement for any defense costs
incurred until such time as the insurer assumes the defense.
Insurers seek timely notice of occurrences and suits not only to
enable them to settle or defend the matter, but also to make a prompt
coverage determination (if the dispute appears to fall outside the scope
of the insuring agreement or within the scope of an exclusion), and to
advise its insured as quickly as possible if there is no coverage.
Although an investigation of coverage primarily will assess the nature of
the claims asserted by the injured party in light of the policy language,
an important part of the investigation involves determining whether the
insurer has any available defenses to coverage on the basis of misrepre-
sentations by the insured during the application or renewal process. Due
to the enormous costs of carefully investigating the accuracy of every
226. See Kerr, 670 N.E.2d at 765 (finding that Lloyd's of London excess policies contained no
duty to defend). As the Kerr court explained:
Notice provisions in insurance policies serve the important function of allowing the
insurer the opportunity to make timely and thorough investigation of the insured's
claim . . . . Although generally an excess insurer does not reserve the right to
participate in the defense of the claim, this is not tantamount to a surrender by the
insurer of its right to protect its own interests .... Thus, notice provisions are valid
prerequisites to coverage and not mere technical requirements which the insured is
free to overlook or ignore with impunity.
Id. See also University of Illinois v. Continental Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1355 (11. Ct. App.
1992) (acknowledging that an insurer may wish to monitor the claim and participate in settlement
discussions early in order to limit its exposure, or may wish to institute a loss prevention program
with the employer at the earliest opportunity to prevent future claims of a similar nature).
227. See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272-73 (N.J.
1992). In SL Industries, the employee had sued for age discrimination, and the carrier had denied
coverage on the ground that no "bodily injury" or "personal injury," as those terms were defined
in the policy, had occurred. Discovery revealed that the employee was seeking recovery for
emotional pain and suffering, for which he had received treatment. The insured did not disclose
this information to the insurer for another two years. The court stated that the duty to defend is
inextricably linked with the insurer's right to control the litigation, a fight which could no longer
be enforced with respect to the prior two years of litigation. Id. Consequently, the court held that
"when the insured's delay in providing relevant information prevents the insurer from assuming
control of the defense, the insurance company is liable only for that portion of the defense costs
arising after it was informed of the facts triggering the duty to defend." Id. at 1273.
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representation made by an applicant for insurance at the time of the
application, insurance companies customarily conduct this inquiry after
receiving notice of a potential claim on the policy.
The law of misrepresentation varies from state to state and is often
dictated by statute.228 As a general rule, an insurer will be absolved of
its duties under the policy if an applicant or insured makes a false state-
ment of fact during the application or renewal process that is material to
a risk assumed under the policy, and the insurer relies on this statement
in its setting of premiums or selection of the policy terms. 229 For exam-
ple, when a claims-made policy is sold, there will be a number of ques-
tions on the application relating to any incidents that may develop into
claims during the policy period, since the insurer does not want to
assume the risk of a claim that is almost certain to occur. If the appli-
cant fails to disclose material facts relating to incidents that the applica-
tion seeks information about, the insurer will have a strong argument
that it has no coverage obligations upon proving the
misrepresentation.23 °
Not surprisingly, courts are reluctant to void coverage on account
of misrepresentations. In one recent case, an insured, applying for a
policy with a new carrier that would cover age discrimination liability,
received an EEOC charge three days before the new policy was to take
effect, but still answered "no" in response to a question regarding
knowledge of facts which may reasonably give rise to a claim.231
Although these facts, alone, would appear to meet the general require-
ments of a misrepresentation defense, the court did not void coverage
because the insured had answered "yes" to a different question about
whether any claims had been made because of unfair or improper treat-
ment.232 The court concluded that this affirmative response placed the
carrier on fair notice given the preliminary status of the EEOC charge,
whether or not the insured had this incident in mind when it answered
228. See JERRY, supra note 140, at 680-94.
229. See id. at 680.
230. Insurers may also argue that the applicant concealed material information with the intent
to deceive the insurer about the nature of the risk, but this defense is difficult to establish. In
addition to having to prove the scienter requirement, in many jurisdictions the insurer will have to
demonstrate that it was not feasible to elicit the relevant information during the application
process. The standard reasoning is that the insurer is a sophisticated entity that ought to make
appropriate inquiries, and that the circumstances in which the affirmative burden of providing
information falls on the insured will be relatively rare. See JERRY, supra note 139, at 697 (noting
that "the concealment doctrine developed during a time when underwriting procedures were less
sophisticated than they are today . . . More recently, numerous courts have held that unless the
insurer specifically requests information, a prospective insured is under no duty to volunteer it").
231. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Cary Community Consol. Sch. Dist. No.
26, No. 93C6526, 1995 WL 66303 (N.D. I11. Feb. 15, 1995).
232. See id. at *6.
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the question.233 The insured's responses on the application, taken
together as a whole, were deemed sufficient to trigger a duty on the part
of the carrier to follow up with further inquiry seeking specifics of any
potential or incipient claims.
Despite the hesitancy of many courts to void coverage, another
recent decision underscores the significance of the misrepresentation
defense for insurers.234 When applying for a variation on a D&O policy
that would provide coverage for the actions of public officials carrying
out their duties, a member of a Board of County Commissioners
answered "no" when asked whether any public official knew of any fact,
circumstance, or situation indicating the probability of a claim within the
coverage of the policy. Unbeknownst to the official completing the
application, the county sheriff had quietly entered into a confidential
conciliation agreement with an employee who had filed an EEOC charge
alleging sexual harassment and retaliatory discrimination. The
employee filed a new charge and a federal lawsuit after the local paper
reported the matter, and the county then sought insurance coverage for
the matter. The Sixth Circuit held that the insurer was not obligated
under the policy due to the material misrepresentations about the prior
EEOC charge.
There is no suggestion that the Board consciously withheld
information from [the insurer]. Rather, it is mutually agreed that the
failure to disclose resulted from Commissioner Bell's innocent igno-
rance of the emerging problem. Nevertheless, the sheriff is a "public
official" in Holmes County, and that public official knew very well,
at the time that the Board applied for renewal of the.., policy, that a
claim or action was probable. Consequently, the district court cor-
rectly found that ... the policy excluded from coverage all claims for
indemnification.2 35
The insured's duty to be truthful in the application process is not just a
duty to avoid fraudulent misrepresentations, but also a duty to avoid
even innocent misrepresentations of facts material to the risk.
B. Insurer's Duties: Indemnification and Defending Claims
The principal obligation of the insurer is to pay covered losses. For
example, the CGL policy provides that the insurer will pay those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages for cov-
ered losses. This obligation is straightforward. Although complex dis-
233. See id.
234. See Board of County Comm'rs v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 93-3417, 1994
WL 540663 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1994).
235. Id. at *6.
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putes may arise over whether the losses are covered under the policy, the
insurer's duty to pay damages on behalf of the insured is usually not
controversial once these matters have been adjudicated. An important
exception is the line of "bad faith" cases that involve an insurer refusing
to settle a pending claim within the policy limits, thereby exposing the
insured to excess liability.236
In contrast to the duty to pay damages, the insurer's "right and
duty" to defend the employer in suits seeking such damages raises more
complex issues. As a general rule, primary liability coverages provide
that the insurer "will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking"
236. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). This landmark case
established the modem cause of action for "bad faith" in insurance claims settlement, involving an
insurer that failed to take account of its insured's interests when it declined to settle the case
within the policy limits, thereby subjecting the insured to liability in the amount that the judgment
exceeded the policy limits. Although premised on the general duty of good faith and fair dealing
implied in every contract, id. at 201, insurance carriers are subjected to tort damages when they
breach this contractual duty. Cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988)
(refusing to extend tort damages beyond the insurance context, holding that only contract damages
are available to an employee suing his employer for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing).
The unique "bad faith" cause of action in the insurance context "evolved as a means of
imposing sanctions on insurers whose negligence or intentional misconduct frustrate the smooth
functioning of the insurance mechanism." STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY
AND DAMAGES § 1.11 (1994). If not subjected to tort damages, insurers would be free to withhold
a reasonable settlement offer in an effort to obtain a defendant's verdict at trial, knowing that their
exposure for this calculated risk is "capped" by the policy limits. Id. § 2.03.
Refusing to indemnify the employer after the litigation has ended with a verdict that falls
within the coverage of the policy will likely render the insurer subject to a tort action for bad faith.
See, e.g., Bugni v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, No. 86-1005, 1987 WL 267484 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb.
17 1987). In Bugni, the insured employer sued for bad faith breach when the primary and excess
carriers refused to indemnify him for his defense expenditures, and the jury verdict entered in
favor of the employee. The court held that the jury verdict (finding a wrongful discharge but no
bad faith on the part of the employer) eliminated the insurer's arguments that the allegations
concerned intentional actions excluded by the policy. Id. at *5. "[W]e conclude that, once the
federal verdict was rendered, none of the defenses the [insurer] asserted had a reasonable basis in
the law. None of the propositions upon which [the insurer] founded its refusal to pay was fairly
debatable." Id. The case was remanded for further fact-finding regarding the bad faith claim.
The "bad faith" doctrine was raised in an interesting manner by an employer in Ottumwa
Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993). In
Ottumwa, the employee had sued for sex discrimination and filed a claim for worker's
compensation benefits. The insurer defended the worker's compensation claim but refused to
defend the discrimination suit under either the Workers' Compensation policy or the CGL policy.
The employee eventually withdrew her claim for worker's compensation benefits in the face of a
vigorous defense and pursued only her civil claims. The employer claimed in later litigation
against the insurer
that the insurer had acted in bad faith by refusing to settle the worker's compensation claim, on
the theory that settlement of the worker's compensation claim would have assisted with the
disposition of the civil claim. The court made short work of responding to this assertion:
"Because there was no basis for [the employee's] workers' compensation claim, State Farm-
under the duty to defend provision-had every right to defend the claim in the way it did." Id. at
730.
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damages that fall within the coverage provisions.237 Because discrimi-
nation claims can often involve fact-specific claims arising in an unset-
tled or contested area of law, the resulting extensive discovery and
motion practice means that defense costs are often as substantial as the
ultimate recovery or settlement obtained by the employee. Thus, the
insurer's obligation to provide a defense is an extremely important part
of the policy. Because the duty to defend is independent of the insurer's
duty to indemnify, it is possible that an employer can secure a defense of
an action that ultimately results in liabilities that are not covered by the
policy.
Many states continue to define the insurer's duty to defend by
employing the traditional rule-that the court need only compare the
allegations in the underlying complaint with the coverage provisions of
the policy.238 In some cases, courts have held that there is no duty to
defend, even if some of the causes of action pleaded in the complaint
appear to be within coverage, if the factual allegations of the complaint
taken as a whole, if proven, would not trigger coverage.239 Other states
have articulated a modem rule that more broadly interprets the duty to
defend, holding that the duty is triggered not just by the facts alleged in
the underlying complaint, but also in light of all relevant extrinsic
facts. 240  As one court recently explained, the liberal rule is warranted
237. Of course, not all liability policies provide for a defense of suits seeking covered
damages, and so the policy language must be examined to determine the employer's rights. See
Society Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 68624, 1995 WL 753943, at *3-
4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1995) (involving a policy that afforded the insurer the "right" but not
the "duty" to defend); Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp.
597, 603-04 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (policy provided only for indemnification, no duty to defend). On
the other hand, the employer should not look just to its primary liability carriers for a defense, as
an excess policy may contain a "drop down" duty to defend in the absence of a duty to defend
under a primary policy. See, e.g., Omark Industries, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 590 F. Supp.
114, 116 (D. Or. 1984).
238. See generally APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 4683 (1979). For example, Texas and Indiana
have held to the "four corners" rule in the face of change, limiting the duty of defense to cases in
which the complaint pleads a covered injury. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health
Care Ass'n, Inc., 2 F.3d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1993); Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d
1283, 1285 (Ind. 1991) (rejecting the liberal test adopted by the court of appeals).
239. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1995) (holding that the duty to defend is not triggered despite the plaintiffs allegations of
negligent retention of an employee engaging in sexual harassment, since the facts pleaded alleged
a continuing pattern of discrimination and harassment that was known to the employer).
240. In contrast, California has adopted the more liberal test, construing the duty to defend to
be implicated when either the facts alleged in the complaint or extrinsic facts raise the possibility
that the complaint might later be amended to seek recovery for a covered injury. See Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (ruling that the duty to defend is based on the
"facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources. An insurer,
therefore bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the
potential of liability under the policy").
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because employers "expect their coverage and defense benefits to be
determined by the nature of the claim against them, not by the fortuity of
how the plaintiff, a third party, chooses to phrase the complaint."2'
This rationale seems especially apt in the discrimination context, where
generally pleaded complaints might be tried on a disparate treatment,
disparate impact, or combined theory, once discovery is complete and
the case is framed by the plaintiffs lawyer.242 However, even under the
liberal "extrinsic facts" test, the duty to defend is not without limits.
The insured cannot trigger the duty to defend simply by denying the
uncovered allegations of the complaint and then contend that any poten-
tial liabilities will fall within coverage. 43
Even when judged solely against the allegations in the complaint,
the general rule is that the duty to defend is triggered when the potential
exists for the third party plaintiff-employee to prevail against the insured
on the basis of a covered occurrence or claim.2" This standard provides
241. SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992). One
commentator notes that this rule "is sensible: an insurer should not be allowed to escape its
obligations by ignoring true facts, simply because the plaintiff failed to allege them." JERRY,
supra note 140, at 733. See, e.g., American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Med. Supply, 699 F.
Supp. 787, 794 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (providing that a duty to defend is triggered when an employee
alleges in her declaration in support of the omplaint that the employer made false statements to
humiliate her, although the complaint does not allege facts giving rise to potential liability for
defamation).
The "liberal" rule is required in states that have adopted notice pleading, since the complaint
in these jurisdictions is an unreliable gauge of the facts forming the basis of the plaintiffs claims.
See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Of
course, the "liberal" rule might work in the insurer's favor if the complaint potentially triggers
coverage, but the facts surrounding the matter establish that no coverage under the policy in fact is
triggered. See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morgan, 418 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend because the sexual conduct in question either
was intentional and excluded from coverage, or was consensual and therefore nonactionable,
regardless of the phrasing of the allegations in the complaint).
242. See Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986) (providing that the duty to defend is triggered by a complaint pleading only disparate
treatment discrimination, given that the case ultimately was tried on both theories and extrinsic
evidence suggested the potential of disparate impact liability, and in light of the complexity of
discrimination law and the liberal notice pleading rules of modern civil procedure).
243. See Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The court
stated that:
[A] mere denial of liability does not create the potential for coverage. If that were
the case, an insurer would have the duty to defend every tendered claim without
regard to the limitations of its policy .... Thus, the issue under the policy is not
whether the appellants have admitted liability, but rather whether [the underlying
plaintiff's] allegations would be covered if they were true.
Id. at 183.
244. Compare Ellis v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., 619 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a wrongful discharge claim premised on retaliation for assertion of FLSA rights
triggered the duty to defend because the retaliatory actions pleaded in the complaint might
ultimately result in an award of damages for personal injuries on account of covered torts, such as
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employers facing discrimination suits with the argument that, even
though the underlying complaint is framed in terms of disparate treat-
ment, there is a real potential for liability being assessed under a dispa-
rate impact theory of recovery.2 45 In a recent New York decision, the
supreme court pushed this rationale even further by finding that there
was a duty to defend a complaint alleging intentional age discrimination,
even though disparate impact is not recognized as a cause of action
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Instead, the court
argued that the "reasonable possibility" that a disparate impact theory
might ultimately be "recognized as valid" raised the potential that the
complaint would result in covered damages.246 Nevertheless, if the facts
alleged in the complaint, even when considered in the context of all
available extrinsic evidence, do not raise the potential for covered liabil-
ities, the insurer will have no duty to defend.247
invasions of privacy, humiliation and discrimination, even though these torts were not expressly
pleaded) with French Cleaners, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. CV 92-0518285, 1995
WL 91423, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1995) (finding no coverage for an age discrimination
claim that alleged no defamatory statements by the employer that caused injury: "A different
question might have been presented if [the employee] had sought damages for injury to her
professional reputation as a result of [the employer's] allegedly discriminatory treatment of her on
account of her age."). In California, which has adopted the "extrinsic facts" test of the duty to
defend, the rule regarding the broad scope of the duty to defend is summarized as follows:
The duty to defend arises as long as the facts (either expressed or implied in the
third party's complaint, or as learned from other sources) give rise to a potentially
covered claim, even though the insurer's investigation produces facts showing the
claim is baseless. It is the insurer's duty to prove the allegations false.
Devin v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citations
omitted). See also City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D.
Me. 1994); Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App.
1994).
245. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that, despite
an EEOC complaint alleging intentional discrimination, a duty to defend existed because the
complaint was broadly alleged so as to permit recovery under either theory of discrimination).
The court reasoned:
Especially since the advent of notice pleading, in a case where there is doubt as to
whether a theory of recovery within the policy coverage has been pleaded in the
underlying complaint, the insurer must defend, and its defense obligations will
continue until such time as the claim against the insured is confined to a recovery
that the policy does not cover.
Id. at 1185 (citations omitted).
246. American Management Ass'n v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802, 807 (Sup. Ct.
1996).
247. See, e.g., Zack Company v. Liberty Mut., No. 93-7015, 1995 WL 33135 (N.D. Ill. June 2,
1995) (finding that the insurer's duty to defend ended when the defamation allegations that
triggered the duty to defend were dropped in the amended complaint); Kline v. The Kemper
Group, 826 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (excess carrier's duty to defend is not triggered where
the underlying suit seeking back pay had no potential to result in damages exceeding the $1
million primary layer of insurance), aff'd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994); Reliable Springs Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993, 994 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[W]hile the mere possibility of
coverage may trigger an obligation to defend, such obligation is not without limitation. Where a
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It is universally acknowledged that the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to pay losses under the policy.248 This is true in a very
obvious sense, given .that the insurer promises to defend any suit alleg-
ing damages covered by the policy, whereas the insurer will not have to
pay any sums if the employer prevails in the litigation. 249  The breadth
of the duty to defend is more expansive than the duty to pay in other far-
reaching respects as well, due to the expansive reading of the duty by
most courts. First, the general rule is that a complaint that raises one
claim within the policy coverage generally triggers a duty to defend the
insured against all claims asserted in the complaint, due to the difficulty
of bifurcating control over the litigation or of later apportioning the costs
when the case involves a number of interlocking and overlapping
claims. 50 Moreover, even where the policy provides that the duty to
defend terminates when the policy limit has been exhausted "in the pay-
claim is the subject of a clear exclusion, there is no duty to defend."). But see Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 869 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (dissenting judge argued that the duty to defend should not be triggered when the plaintiff
was seeking only reinstatement rather than damages, since there was no potential that the
employer would incur covered liabilities), aff'd, 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994).
248. A frequently litigated question is whether the insurer must defend the employer in
proceedings before an administrative agency, with the issue framed in terms of whether the
administrative proceeding has the potential to result in covered liabilities. See Campbell Soup Co.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that an EEOC
probable cause determination in itself does not institute a "suit" that is coercive in nature with the
potential of an award of covered damages); Solo Cup Co., 619 F.2d at 1188 (finding a General
Services Administration review of the employer's alleged discriminatory practices, resulting in a
"proposal" to pay back wages as part of a conciliation process in order to maintain federal
government contracting status, did not raise the potential of an award of covered damages).
249. See Reliable Springs Co., 869 F.2d at 994 ("The obligation to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnify. The insured must be defended where there is any possibility of coverage. The
duty to indemnify only arises when there is, in fact, coverage."). For example, in American
Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. M.B., 563 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), the insurer provided a
defense through trial, but then successfully argued that the jury verdict established that the
insured's actions were not an occurrence.
250. See, e.g., Schmidt, 684 A.2d at 76 (duty to defend exists until the allegation of negligent
infliction of emotional distress is resolved in the insured's favor; no apportionment of defense
costs is appropriate when the negligent count remains in the case until the verdict is rendered);
Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d I (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("If a complaint
states several possible theories of recovery, the insurer must defend the entire claim unless and
until the insurer is able to limit the complaint to theories for which it has provided no insurance."),
overruled on other grounds by LaJolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem., 884 P.2d
1048 (Cal. 1995) (en banc); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993). But see Great American, 621 N.E.2d at 801-02 (Ford, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the court should more strictly assess whether covered and non-covered claims arise from the same
occurrence); SL Industries, 607 A.2d at 1280 (holding that the duty to defend arises only with
respect to covered claims and rejecting the majority rule presuming that these costs cannot be
apportioned between insurer and insured). Courts have shown a willingness to bifurcate defense
costs between covered and non-covered claims when the circumstances of the case make it
relatively easy to do so. See EEOC v. Southern Publ'g Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 791-92 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that defense costs incurred by the insured could be prorated reasonably and fairly
[Vol. 52:1
1997] INSURANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 71
ment of judgments or settlements," many courts hold that the insurer
cannot refuse to provide a defense in on-going litigation, even if it
agrees to tender the policy limits into the court registry to be applied
against the eventual judgment or settlement."z 1 Finally, courts have also
employed the doctrine of reasonable expectations to expand the duty to
defend by finding that reasonable insureds expect to be defended in civil
actions even when the potential for an award of covered losses is
slim. 2
52
Wrongfully refusing to provide a defense is a breach of contract by
the insurer, but the consequences of breaching this provision go beyond
the standard remedies for breach of contract. Obviously, if the insured
wins a later lawsuit alleging that the insured failed to provide a defense,
the employer will be able to recover the defense expenditures it incurred
in addition to indemnification for covered judgments or settlements, and
may even be able to recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
securing this reimbursement.253 The measure of damages is much
broader, however, in light of the rule that an insurer that wrongfully
refuses to provide a defense will be "estopped from raising noncoverage
as a defense under the indemnity provisions of the policy. 2 54 This rem-
where the duty to defend was triggered by allegations of assault and battery, but these counts were
dismissed because the statute of limitations had run).
A collateral effect of broadly construing the duty to defend in this way is to raise a signif a.i.:
conflict of interest between the insurer conducting the litigation and the employer/defenda;it.
Because the insurer will only be obliged to pay covered damages awarded in the suit, it has a
financial interest in ensuring that a verdict will be more heavily weighted toward non- covered
claims. Given this conflict, states adopt a variety of responses, including: allowing the insured mo
select the defense counsel, requiring the insurer to reimburse the employer's counsel to mnl;er: ,.;
the litigation, or simply ignoring the potential for conflict altogether. See Eric M. Holr ...
Conflicts-of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an Ethical Tight, "P,
Without a Net, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1 (1989); Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Duty of Insured to
Pay for Independent Counsel When Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured and Insurer, 50
A.L.R. 4th 932 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
251. JERRY, supra note 140, at 744-48. Cf. Ellis v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1130,
1130 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that CGL and umbrella carriers who refused to defend an
action where some of the allegations potentially came within the policy coverage were liable for
the attorney fees expended by the insured and the settlement paid to the employee, subject to the
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness of those sums).
252. See generally supra Part II.B.
253. See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Minn. 1986); Schmidt,
684 A.2d at 76 (insured employer whose harassment was outside coverage but nevertheless was
entitled to a defense under the policy is entitled to attorneys' fees in subsequent coverage
litigation).
254. Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1292 1i.
App. Ct. 1994) (noting the congruity of Illinois and California law on this point); Solo Cup Co.,
619 F.2d at 1184:
If... we determine that the duty to defend was violated, the applicable Illinois law
holds that the insurer is estopped to deny coverage .. . and provides for the
following broad measure of damages to the insured: (1) the costs of defending the
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edy is potentially significant, since the duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnify. If the verdict is unclear with regard to the grounds
for the award, the insurer that failed to defend the action is bound to
provide coverage as if the jury had specified that covered events resulted
in the damage award. 55 Moreover, even if the verdict establishes that
there was no covered occurrence, an insurer with a duty to defend an
employer must reimburse the employer for damages attributable to non-
covered events. Additionally, if the employer resolves the matter by
settlement, this same logic leads some courts to preclude the insurer
from challenging the amount of the settlement or attempting to allocate
it among covered and non-covered claims. 256 Finally, some courts have
extended the "bad faith" analysis to apply to the insurer's refusal to pro-
vide a defense, presumably on the ground that even the foregoing reme-
dies may be insufficient to prevent the insurance company from
strategically refusing to expend large amounts in defense costs until
forced to do so by an employer who brings suit.2 57
Given the substantial damages facing an insurer if it wrongly
refuses to defend a tendered claim, one might expect insurers to provide
suit; (2) the amount recovered from the insured, either by way of judgment or
settlement; and, (3) any additional damages caused by the insurer's breach of
contract.
255. See Schmidt, 684 A.2d at 69.
256. See JERRY, supra note 140, at 754-55. The insurer is estopped from challenging the
settlement or attempting to allocate it between covered and non-covered claims, but the insurer is
protected by the rule that the insured must demonstrate that the settlement was reasonable. School
Dist. for City of Royal Oak v. Continental Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990) (remanding the
case for a factual determination of whether the employer reasonably paid $250,000 to a
discrimination plaintiff when the record indicated that the case could have settled for $60,000 if
the plaintiff had been reinstated with tenure).
257. See generally Tibbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming an
award of $600,000 punitive damages for breach of the duty to defend); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Price, 684 P.2d 524, 532 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (remanding the case to determine whether the
insurer's breach of the duty to defend amounted to closing its eyes to the facts and acting in bad
faith).
With respect to employment discrimination liabilities, it often is the case that an insurer's
denial of coverage is premised on a good faith and reasonable objection to the insured's reading of
the policy in the context of a complex and dynamic legal environment; thus, recovery by an
insured for bad faith denial of coverage is likely to be rare. See, e.g., New Madrid County
Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Continental Cas. Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1243 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the insurer was not subject to damages for vexatious refusal to pay policy proceeds
and emphasizing that it "is clear that Continental Casualty entertained an honest difference of
opinion as to the policy's coverage. Although its position ultimately was rejected, that position
was by no means frivolous or unreasonable"); Clark-Peterson Co. Inc. v. Indep. Ins. Assoc., Ltd.,
514 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Iowa 1994) ("Defendants were not overly litigious, they merely believed
no coverage existed under the policy, a contention with which we initially agreed. Once a final
determination was made, the defendants promptly paid the entire claim. .... The coverage was
reasonably debatable in view of our final determination."); Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("A denial of coverage based on a reasonable
interpretation of the policy is not bad faith.").
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a defense until such time as the coverage matters are clarified. How-
ever, the general rule is that an insurer that assumes the defense of an
action is precluded from later raising coverage defenses, given the obvi-
ous prejudice that the insured could suffer if the insurer is permitted to
control, and thereby, reshape the litigation in a manner that defeats cov-
erage.258 "[T]he rule prevents an insurance company from taking over
the defense of a matter but avoiding coverage of the end result, without
an adequate reservation and warning to the insured [which would per-
mit] the insured [to] make its own decision regarding the need [to hire]
independent defense counsel" in order to protect the insured's rights.259
However, this rule is inapplicable if the insurer can demonstrate that it
undertook the defense in a manner that did not prejudice the insured's
interests, as when an insurer simply reimburses the insured for defense
expenditures for counsel selected by and controlled by the insured.26 °
Consequently, an insurer appears to be faced with a difficult
choice: refuse to defend and be estopped from asserting coverage
defenses if there was a duty to defend, or undertake the defense and be
estopped from asserting coverage defenses due to its prejudicial control
of the litigation. However, the courts have fashioned a middle ground
approach that permits the insurer to preserve its rights, while still pro-
tecting the insured's interest in receiving a defense promptly after the
litigation is commenced. When facing a claim that, arguably, is outside
coverage, the prudent insurer will either assume the defense with a writ-
ten reservation of right to later deny coverage and seek reimbursement if
the suit is found to be outside coverage, or it will assume the defense
and immediately file a declaratory judgment action to absolve it of fur-
ther defense obligations.261 In order to preserve its right to seek later
258. See JERRY, supra note 140, at 757 (noting that "it is well settled that if the insurer
undertakes to defend the action, it will be estopped to deny coverage by virtue of performing its
defense duty").
259. Golf Course Superintendents Assoc. of Am. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 761 F.
Supp. 1485, 1492 (D. Kan. 1991).
260. See id. at 1493; see also KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 10. The authors state:
When an insurer has selected the defense attorney and provided direction for the
defense, the case for issue preclusion [regarding coverage] is very persuasive.
However, if the insurer was not involved either as a party in the tort litigation or in
the capacity of providing a defense to the insured (typically as a consequence of
selecting, instructing, and compensating the defense counsel), the justification for
concluding that the resolution of the tort suit precludes an insurer from an
opportunity for adjudication is not equally evident.
Id. at 861.
261. See JERRY, supra note 140, at 757; see also Zach Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-
7015, 1995 WL 33135 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1995). In Zach, an insured employer was sued for
retaliatory discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, but the
defamation count was not included in a later complaint after the first complaint was dismissed
voluntarily. The district court first awarded summary judgment to the insurer. Id. at *2. The
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reimbursement of the defense costs that it incurs, the insurer is under an
obligation to put the insured on fair notice that it is reserving this right
and cannot rely upon a generally worded reservation of rights later.262
The burden of the duty to defend is accepted by insurers in order to
obtain the extremely valuable right to control the litigation and disposi-
tion of the underlying claim. This control is crucial in the employment
litigation setting, since emotions often run high. Recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a law firm could
not prevent its liability insurer from settling a hostile environment and
sexual harassment suit.263 Although the firm argued that the litigation
was groundless and that settling the suit would injure its reputation, and
also that the settlement would preclude it from pursuing a later suit for
malicious prosecution against the plaintiff, the court permitted the
insurer to settle with the plaintiff based on the clear provisions in the
policy. 26 The court noted that an employer wishing to retain control
over settlement of cases (as many professionals choose to do in their
malpractice policies) must purchase a policy that affords this right.265
insured argued that the insurer's failure to seek declaratory judgment or to provide a defense under
a reservation of rights estopped the insurer from denying coverage. However, the court found that
the second complaint filed by the insured's employee did not trigger the duty to defend, thereby
relieving insurer of any obligations. Id. Nevertheless, this judgment was subsequently vacated to
the extent that the insured sought recovery of attorneys fees for defending the first complaint until
it was dismissed. Zack Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-C-7015 1995 WL 340955, at *6
(N.D. Ill. June 2, 1995).
262. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 749
(1 th Cir. 1991) (finding that an umbrella carrier that entered into a "Compromise Settlement
Agreement" with an employer to defend a pending racial discrimination suit is precluded from
recouping its defense costs, despite the absence of coverage, because it undertook the defense
without adequately reserving its rights); see also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco
Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 114-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that an insurer that
undertook defense after sending a reservation of rights letter to the employer was precluded from
seeking reimbursement, despite a final determination of no duty to defend or indemnify, since the
insured employer did not expressly or impliedly agree to the reservation). In Buss v. Superior
Court, 47 Cal. App. 4th 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), a coverage case involving commercial
liabilities, the court recently offered a sensible rule: an insurer that provides a defense under a
proper reservation of rights is not entitled to reimbursement of defense expenditures in connection
with claims for which potential coverage existed but were ultimately determined not to be covered
(since the duty to defend covers such situations), but is entitled to recover reimbursement for
defending claims as to which there was no potential for coverage but nonetheless were defended
because they were joined with other claims for which a potential for coverage did exist.
263. See Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1995).
264. See id. at 839.
265. See id. at 839-40 ("It is not appropriate for us to amend the policy here in order to give
[the insured] a type of coverage for which it didn't contract.").
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VII. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF ALLEGING
DISCRIMINATION
As the potential availability of insurance coverage for employers
facing discrimination claims has become more widely appreciated, law-
yers for discrimination plaintiffs are in a position to frame their factual
allegations in order to maximize the likelihood that insurance coverage
will either be triggered or precluded. The presence of insurance cover-
age in the case will undoubtedly change the nature of the litigation.
Assuming that the typical plaintiff is interested in achieving a speedy
settlement that delivers substantially what they are seeking in the litiga-
tion, it is not clear as a categorical matter whether the insurance cover-
age will be a help or hindrance to achieving this goal.266
Discrimination plaintiffs might view insurance coverage as benefi-
cial to their interests for a variety of reasons, including: bringing a third
party with control of settlement into the litigation that is focused on a
cost-effective resolution of the dispute, and is less tied up with the per-
sonalities and emotions involved; ensuring a source of proceeds from
which to pay a settlement or judgment; and securing representation of
the employer by counsel selected by the insurer that may have broader
discrimination law experience and might provide a more balanced
assessment of the potential exposure than would be provided by the
employer's regular litigation counsel. Conversely, discrimination plain-
tiffs might view insurance coverage as detrimental to their interests for a
variety of reasons, including: having to deal with a third party that is
oriented toward economic resolutions of the dispute, rather than pursu-
ing reinstatement or other non-economic solutions; bringing insurance
defense counsel into the matter who may be less likely to effectuate a
quick settlement by aggressively investigating and assessing the case at
the outset; providing the employer with a "free" defense of the action,
and therefore, removing some of the economic incentive to reach an
early settlement; and running the risk of facing an insurance company
that takes a very aggressive stance in litigation in order to develop a
reputation among the plaintiffs' bar for refusing to settle matters easily.
266. Cf. Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 991 F.2d 497, 505
(9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's narrow reading of the
duty to defend in light of the specific allegations of the complaint, because it would permit a
discrimination plaintiff "by artful construction of its pleadings, [to] preclude its opponent's
insurance coverage and thereby obtain a tremendous litigation advantage"). However, as
discussed below, it will not necessarily be the case that a plaintiff will seek to preclude coverage;
moreover, a plaintiff can still artfully construct its pleadings to affect potential insurance coverage
even in those jurisdictions that give the broadest possible reading of the duty to defend. A
plaintiffs lawyer is likely to view insurance coverage in a favorable light. See Wayne v. Outten,
What a Plaintiffs Lawyer Looks for When Evaluating a Potential Lawsuit, in AVOIDING
WORKPLACE LrIGATION (PLI, No. H4-5261, Apr. 1997).
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These conflicting considerations about the effects of insurance are likely
to be weighed only in light of the specific context of a particular lawsuit.
A discrimination plaintiff seeking to trigger coverage should pursue
several general strategies. 67 First, allegations of negligent, as well as
intentional, behavior should be expressly pleaded.268 In particular, the
plaintiff should plead both disparate impact and disparate treatment the-
ories of discrimination to the extent warranted by the facts. Addition-
ally, the plaintiff should plead all related torts stemming from the
discriminatory incidents, since one or more torts such as defamation,
humiliation, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, harassment, or
assault and battery, may be included within the grant of coverage in a
general liability policy or excess policy. In many cases where the court
denies coverage to the employer, there is a suggestion that a differently
pleaded complaint might well have triggered coverage in the case.269
267. To state the obvious, a plaintiff seeking to avoid insurance coverage should proceed in
exactly the opposite manner. Needless to say, the discussion that follows assumes that the
plaintiff will abide by all rules of professional conduct and will not plead her complaint in a
frivolous or vexatious manner solely to trigger or preclude insurance coverage. The
considerations discussed in this section pertain to decisions about how to frame the complaint
given a core set of factual allegations, as opposed to "creating" causes of action out of thin air for
strategic purposes.
268. This can be particularly important when the plaintiff is suing for intentional harassment
and assault, but also can seek to recover in negligence against the employing business entity. See,
e.g., Schmidt, 684 A.2d at 68-69 (coverage exists when plaintiff pleaded negligence counts against
corporate defendant and the insurer refused to defend). However, one commentator, a senior vice
president at an insurer, has suggested that several recent decisions "evidence a willingness of the
courts to look beyond the allegations framed within the four corners of a complaint and not allow
a 'negligent tail' to wag the 'intentional dog."' Monteleone, supra note 184, at 53. A recent
example of such a result is Vienna Family Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 580 (9th
Cir. 1996) (finding that the negligence allegations made by the plaintiff employee were a
transparent attempt to trigger coverage for claims clearly premised on intentional acts).
269. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distrib., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 376,
381 (D.S.C. 1993) ("Although Ms. Pressley alleges loss of reputation as part of her damages, her
complaint contains no cause of action for invasion of privacy or defamation."); Omark Indus., Inc.
v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 590 F. Supp. 114, 120-21 (D. Or. 1984) ("The gravamen of the...
plaintiffs' complaint was for employment discrimination because of sex. They did not allege
damage to their own reputation or other damage to them flowing from the publication or utterance
of any libelous, disparaging statement. Therefore, coverage . . . is inapplicable."); Moore v.
Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no coverage when
the plaintiff failed to plead defamation and false imprisonment separately, since the allegations of
a pattern of sexual harassment "do no more than reflect the reality that such harassment can take
place behind closed doors or in the presence of coworkers"), reh 'g granted, opinion not citeable
(Apr. 26, 1996), opinion on reh'g not for publication (June 14, 1996); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding no coverage was available
since the plaintiff failed to allege defamation or invasion of privacy by publication), rev. denied,
662 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1995); French Cleaners, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 1995 No. CV92-
051-8285, WL 91423, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1995) (finding that personal injury
coverage is not triggered, but that a "different question might have been presented if Ms. Javier
had sought damages for injury to her professional reputation" as a result of the discriminatory
discharge); Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Iowa
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Finally, as facts develop during discovery, the plaintiff should be atten-
tive to the possibility of amending the complaint to include allegations
more likely to trigger insurance coverage. 70 In the event that the
employer has purchased an EPLI policy, there will likely be little dispute
as to whether the claim triggers insurance coverage; thus, strategic
pleading is less of a concern.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
For the employer seeking insurance coverage of a discrimination
claim, the contra proferentem maxim and the reasonable expectations
doctrine are tools for transforming various forms of liability policies into
valuable economic resources for managing the employer's exposure and
losses. The flexibility evidenced in the court decisions is not wholly
unprincipled, however, since most courts at some point will respect the
ability of insurers to define the scope of the risks they are assuming by
careful policy drafting. Insurers are most likely to be able to enforce
limitations on coverage for employment litigation if: (1) they limit their
risks plainly and clearly and in accordance with the policy premiums
being charged (2) the limitations are either consistent with the
employer's reasonable expectations or are marketed in a manner
designed to eliminate such expectations.271 The recent efforts by insur-
ers to amend their policies to exclude clearly and precisely any coverage
for liability related to employment practices are likely to continue to
pass judicial muster. If so, in many cases employers may be precluded
from asserting potential coverage under the policy, and thereby, trigger-
ing the insurer's duty to defend. Nevertheless, the dynamic character of
the law governing employment relations and the insurance industry's
responses to these changes will continue, and so will the battles between
employers and their insurers. The relatively new market for EPLI insur-
1993) (holding that no coverage existed since the plaintiffs did not seek damages for injury to their
reputations despite interpreting coverage of "publication of ... disparaging material" to be
broader than the tort of defamation).
270. Cf. EEOC v. Southern Publ'g Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that
coverage was triggered when plaintiffs intervened in a Title VII complaint brought by the EEOC
and alleged additional counts of assault and battery against their harasser and defamation against
the company president for statements made about their termination). A recent case demonstrates
the limit of such strategic behavior. In Cornhill Insurance PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80 (5th
Cir. 1997), the plaintiff-employee reached a settlement with the insured-employer, pursuant to
which she agreed not to execute on the judgment in return for an assignment of the employer's
claims against its various insurers. The employee then sued the employer's various insurers after
amending her complaint to delete all allegations of intentional wrongdoing. The court denied
coverage under all policies. Id. at 88-89.
271. Cf. KEa-rON & WIDISS, supra note 10.
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ance might be expected to grow quickly to fill the gap created by the
increasing use of carefully drafted exclusions, but this development will
likely lead to new questions and problems as courts begin to interpret
these new policies.
Perhaps the most important development will not be the shifts in
the unending coverage disputes between employers and their liability
carriers, but rather the effect on employer behavior if liability coverage
becomes generally available for employment discrimination claims. It
may well be, as noted by several courts and commentators, that the
existence of insurance coverage will foster increased compliance with
anti-discrimination statutes by instituting a secondary system of incen-
tives and penalties that attach to employer behavior. Rather than the
dubious motivations engendered by suffering a large verdict in an emo-
tional jury trial or paying a large settlement at the urgings of defense
counsel, the regular and rational adjustment of premiums in response to
proactive measures designed jointly by the insurer and the employer has
the potential to have a profound impact in the workplace.272 If this
impact materializes, the provision of insurance coverage for employ-
ment discrimination claims will prove to be one of the most important
developments in the law of employment relations in the last several
decades.
272. For example, the availability and cost of EPLI policies for law firms is directly linked to
the proactive practices adopted by firms. See Carriers Stepping Up to Plate With Lawyer's EPLI
Coverage, 3 LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BEN. REP. 1 (Feb. 1997); Practices Impacting Premiums,
Id. at 3; Why Chubb Chooses Not to Cover Counselors, Id. at 6.
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